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AN EPISTEMIC INTERPRETATION OF
PARACONSISTENT WEAK KLEENE LOGIC
Abstract. This paper extends Fitting’s epistemic interpretation of some
Kleene logics to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To
achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting’s “cut-down” operator is discussed,
leading to the definition of a “track-down” operator later used to represent
the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an incon-
sistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made,
the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain
operations defined in this track-down fashion. Finally, further reflections
on conjunction and disjunction in the weak Kleene logics accompany this
paper, particularly concerning their relation with containment logics. These
considerations motivate a special approach to defining sound and complete
Gentzen-style sequent calculi for some of their four-valued generalizations.
Keywords: weak Kleene logic; infectious logic; containment logic; sequent
calculus
1. Introduction
Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic (PWK, for short) is the three-valued
logic that arises from the weak truth-tables due to Kleene [36], when
the intermediate value (which we will, provisionally, call u) is taken to
be a designated value. These truth-tables  represented in Figure 1 be-
low  are referred to as weak, because they exhibit a sort of “infectious”
behavior of the intermediate value: in fact, this value is assigned to a
complex formula whenever one of its components is assigned so.
Moreover, notice that the Paracomplete Weak Kleene logic (Kw3 , for
short) is another three-valued logic that arises from these truth-tables,
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when the intermediate value is not taken to be designated. Naturally,
it is because these logics are defined making essential use of the weak
Kleene truth-tables that, e.g., in [30], Fitting refers to them (and by
extension to their eventual four-valued generalizations, on which more





∧ t u f
t t u f
u u u u
f f u f
∨ t u f
t t u t
u u u u
f t u f
Figure 1. The weak Kleene truth-tables
These systems can be compared, primarily, with the three-valued
logics defined in terms of the otherwise strong Kleene truth-tables  rep-
resented in Figure 2 below. Thus, when the intermediate value featured
in this strong truth-tables is taken to be non-designated the induced
system is usually referred to as Strong Kleene logic (K3, for short), while
the system induced by taking the intermediate value to be designated is
usually referred to as Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP, for short). Analo-
gously to the previous remarks, then, it is because these logics are defined
making essential use of the strong Kleene truth-tables that, e.g. in [29],
Fitting refers to them (and by extension to their eventual four-valued





∧ t u f
t t u f
u u u f
f f f f
∨ t u f
t t t t
u t u u
f t u f
Figure 2. The strong Kleene truth-tables
Among the weak Kleene logics, an increasing amount of recent work
has been focused on Paraconsistent Weak Kleene [see, e.g., 9, 11, 12, 13,
39, 40, 44, 51]. However, what is salient among these works is the absence
of a cogent philosophical interpretation for it. The aim of this paper is
to try to overcome this deficit, by offering an epistemic interpretation
for PWK; that is, an epistemic understanding of its truth-values, its
consequence relation and its characteristic truth-tables.
1 It should be noted that PWK and Kw3 are usually identified as the classi-
cal,“internal” or {¬, ∧, ∨}-fragments of Halldén’s and Bochvar’s logics of nonsense
presented, respectively, in [7] and [32].
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To achieve this goal, we will benefit from Fitting’s epistemic inter-
pretation of some of the Kleene logics in works such as [28, 29, 30].
Interestingly, Fitting himself showed how his epistemic interpretation is
flexible enough not only to endow the strong Kleene logic K3 and one
of its four-valued generalizations, the logic FDE [studied in 6, 19]) with
an epistemic interpretation, but also to provide such a reading for the
paracomplete weak Kleene logic Kw3 and one of its four-valued general-
izations, the logic Sfde (on which more below). Quite surprisingly, an
attempt to broaden the range of application of this reading to cover the
case of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene has not been proposed so far. This
is, specifically, what we intend to do in this paper: to show how Fitting’s
epistemic interpretation of the Kleene logics can also account for the case
of PWK. We are, so to speak, after the missing piece of the puzzle.
To this extent, the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give
a few formal preliminaries and discuss a little bit more rigorously some
aspects of the weak Kleene logics and their four-valued generalizations.
Section 3 is the main section of the paper, where Fitting’s epistemic
interpretation of the Kleene logics is reviewed, and our novel reading
of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene is presented in full detail. Section 4
discusses a number components of the epistemic interpretation of many-
valued logics, in light of some alternative philosophical and technical
approaches appearing in the literature. Section 5 has two parts, and in
each of them additional formal results are presented. First, some new
results are provided, concerning the relation between subsystems of the
weak Kleene logics and containment logics  i.e., systems whose valid in-
ference comply with certain set-theoretic containment principles relating
the set of propositional variables appearing in the premises and the set
of propositional variables appearing in the conclusion. Secondly, making
essential use of these new results, sound and complete Gentzen-style se-
quent calcui for some four-valued generalization of the weak Kleene logics
are introduced. Finally, Section 6 outlines some concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
Let L be a propositional language and let Var be a set of propositional
variables, assumed to be countably infinite. By FOR(L) we denote
the absolutely free algebra (of formulae), freely generated by Var, with
universe FOR(L). In all of the cases considered in this paper the propo-
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sitional language will be limited to the set {¬,∧,∨}. In what follows,
capital Greek letters Γ,∆, etc. will denote sets of formulae, and lower-
case Greek letters ϕ, ψ, etc. will denote arbitrary formulae. As usual, a
logic L is a pair 〈FOR(L),⊢L〉, where ⊢L ⊆ ℘(FOR(L)) × FOR(L) is a
substitution-invariant consequence relation.
For L a propositional language, an L-matrix (a matrix, for short)
is a structure M = 〈V,D,O〉, where 〈V,O〉 is an algebra of the same
similarity type as L, with universe V and a set of operations O, and
D ⊂ V.2 Given a matrix, a valuation v is an homomorphism from
FOR(L) to V, for which we denote by v[Γ ] the set {v(γ) | γ ∈ Γ}, i.e.,
the image of v under Γ . Finally, by a matrix logic L we understand a
pair 〈FOR(L),M〉 where M ⊆ ℘(FOR(L))×FOR(L) is a substitution-
invariant consequence relation defined by letting
Γ M ϕ ⇐⇒ for every valuation v, if v[Γ ] ⊆ D, then v(ϕ) ∈ D
Moreover, when L = 〈FOR(L),M〉 we may alternatively denote M
as L.
Moving on to some specifics of our investigation, when analyzing
logical systems below, it will be useful to consider infectious matrix
logics, as defined below.3
Definition 2.1. A matrix logic L = 〈FOR(L),M〉 is infectious if and
only if there is an element x ∈ V such that for every n-ary f⋄M ∈ O it
holds that
if x ∈ {v1, . . . ,vn}, then f
⋄
M(v1, . . . ,vn) = x
As is easy to see, both Paraconsistent Weak Kleene and Paracomplete
Weak Kleene can be faithfully described as three-valued infectious logics,
with the subtle difference that in the former the infectious value is taken
to be designated, whereas in the latter it is not. Furthermore, of much
interest to us and of much use in finding an epistemic interpretation
for PWK, is to look at infectious subsystems  most particularly four-
valued subsystems  of these three-valued matrix logics. Without loss of
generality, in what follows we will be assuming that semantics for these
2 Notice that O is a set that includes for every n-ary operator ⋄ in the language
L, a corresponding n-ary truth-function f⋄M : V
n −→ V.
3 The following definition is inspired by [34], although a similar definition might
be found in [22]. For a generalization of this notion that also applies to non-
deterministic matrices (as defined in [3]) see [51].
An epistemic interpretation . . . 281
systems count with the classical truth-values t and f , and two additional
truth-values: ⊤ and ⊥.
Four-valued subsystems of the Kleene logics in general, and some
subsystems of PWK in particular, have been studied in recent works
[e.g., 46, 51, 53]. Along this line, normal four-valued generalizations of
the Kleene logics are taken to be those in which the truth-functions for
the connectives coincide with those of Classical Logic, when restricted
to the set {t, f}. Among the normal generalizations, however, there are
two further salient families which have caught the attention of scholars:
the family of regular and the family of monotonic generalizations.
Regular systems are defined in [53, p. 226] to be such that all of their
truth-functions comply with the criterion  quoted from [46, p. 4] with
notation adjusted to fit ours  that a given column (row) of the truth-
table contains t in the ⊤ or ⊥ row (column), only if the column (row) has
t in all of its cells; and likewise for f . Monotonic systems are presented,
as is usual, in terms of all of the truth-functions of the underlying ma-
trix preserving some previously-defined order over the truth-values. As
detailed in [46, p. 4], the four truth-values of Kleene’s four-valued gen-
eralizations are ordered in [53] by letting: ⊥ ≤ f , ⊥ ≤ t, f ≤ ⊤, t ≤ ⊤,
allowing t and f to be incompatible  this is, precisely, the “information”
order of the lattice A4 detailed in [6].
As reported in [46], it was proved in [53] that there are 81 four-
valued monotonic logics of which only 6 are regular. To this extent,
it must be highlighted that the four-valued generalizations of the weak
Kleene logics that we are going to discuss next are not regular, although
they are indeed monotonic  as is routine to check.
In this vein, it is worth looking at the four-valued logic Sfde presented
below, in Definition 2.2. This system, introduced by Harry Deutsch in
[15], has since then been discussed several times in the literature, with
different purposes, e.g., in [25, 29, 38, 45, 48, 51].
Definition 2.2. Sfde is the four-valued logic induced by the matrix







} and these truth-functions are defined by the truth-
tables in Figure 3.
The most important thing about Sfde is that Fitting, in [30], has
taken this logic to be a four-valued generalization of Kw3 . Why so? On
the one hand, it is legitimate to say it is a generalization of Paracomplete
Weak Kleene first, because its semantics include an undesignated infec-









t ⊤ ⊥ f
t t ⊤ ⊥ f
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊥ f
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
f f f ⊥ f
f∨
Sfde
t ⊤ ⊥ f
t t t ⊥ t
⊤ t ⊤ ⊥ ⊤
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
f t ⊤ ⊥ f




tious value, just like the semantics for Kw3 ; secondly, because this fact 
together with the information that it is normal, in the above technical
sense  secures that when valuations are restricted to the set {t,⊥, f}
we obtain nothing more than the semantics for Kw3 . On the other hand,
it is a four-valued generalization, because its semantics include an ad-
ditional non-classical truth-value, namely ⊤, such that both it and its
negation are designated  hence e.g. Explosion, the inference ϕ∧¬ϕ  ψ,
is invalid in Sfde. This informs us, moreover, that we are in front of a
paraconsistent subsystem of Kw3 .
The importance of considering four-valued generalizations of Kleene
logics does not rely, however, just on their technical interest. In fact,
as we will see later in Section 3, it is only after offering an epistemic
interpretation for Belnap-Dunn logic FDE  whose truth-functions are
discussed in Section 3.2 below  and looking at Strong Kleene logic K3
through the eyes of such a reading, that Fitting provided an epistemic
interpretation of the latter. Similarly, it was only after offering an epis-
temic interpretation for Sfde and looking at Paracomplete Weak Kleene
with the tools provided by such a reading, that Fitting arrived at an
epistemic interpretation for Kw3 .
Thus, it will be through a similar path that we will arrive at an epis-
temic interpretation for PWK. We will, then, find a suitable four-valued
generalization of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene, which we will later endow
with an epistemic interpretation. Hence, it will be only after looking at
PWK through this interpretation, that we will be able to provide an
epistemic understanding for it. Our target four-valued system, which we
will call dSfde, is presented below in Definition 2.3. This system was first
introduced in [51], although with a different name.4 Here, we prefer to
call it dSfde for it clearly is the dual of Deutsch’s Sfde.
5
4 In the context of [51], the logic dSfde is referred to as the system Lnb'.
5 Meaning that, letting Σ¬ = {¬σ | σ ∈ Σ} for every Σ ⊆ FOR(L), we can prove:
Γ Sfde ∆ ⇐⇒ ∆
¬ dSfde Γ
¬, which we leave to the reader as an exercise. Moreover, for
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Definition 2.3. The logic dSfde is induced by the matrix 〈VdSfde,DdSfde,


















t ⊤ ⊥ f
t t ⊤ ⊥ f
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
⊥ ⊥ ⊤ ⊥ f
f f ⊤ f f
f∨
dSfde
t ⊤ ⊥ f
t t ⊤ t t
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
⊥ t ⊤ ⊥ ⊥
f t ⊤ ⊥ f
Figure 4. Truth-tables for dSfde (the four-valued generalization of PWK)
The most important thing to say about dSfde is that this logic can,
indeed, be regarded as a four-valued generalization of PWK. Why so?
On the one hand, it is a generalization of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene,
first, because its semantics include a designated infectious value, just
like the semantics for PWK. Secondly, because this fact  together with
the information that it is normal, in the above technical sense  secures
that when valuations are restricted to the set {t,⊤, f} we obtain nothing
more than the semantics for PWK. On the other hand, it is a four-valued
generalization, because its semantics include an additional non-classical
truth-value, namely ⊥, such that both it and its negation are undes-
ignated  hence e.g. Implosion, the inference ψ  ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, is invalid in
dSfde. This informs us, moreover, that we are in front of a paracomplete
subsystem of PWK.
Before moving on to discuss the target epistemic interpretations of
these logics, let us take a brief pause to notice that the weak Kleene
logics and their four-valued generalizations are equipped with conjunc-
tions and disjunctions that are utterly peculiar, least to say. In the
case of Paracomplete Weak Kleene, a remarkable feature of it is that it
invalidates the inference called Addition, i.e. ϕ  ϕ∨ψ. Whereas, in the
case of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene, a remarkable feature of it is that
the purpose of giving a deeper meaning to referring to this four-valued generalization
of PWK with the name dSfde, it would be interesting to present an intensional system
dS which dualizes Deutsch’s S and, then, prove that dSfde is in fact its first-degree
fragment. We conjecture this intensional system can be designed by substituting
the content-inclusion clause γw′ (B) ≤w′ γw′ (A) featured in Ferguson’s semantics for
conditionals in the system S (detailed in [23, pp. 77–79]), with the alternative clause
γw′ (A) ≤w′ γw′ (B).
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it invalidates the inference called Simplification, i.e. ϕ ∧ ψ  ψ. It is
reasonable to ask, then, how the failures of inferences so basic can be
made sense of.
Firstly, regarding the failure of Addition, various explanations have
been given, which appeal to the meaninglessness [7] or the off-topic
character [4] of the issues represented by the newly added disjuncts,
to free-choices in deontic logic [56], computational failures [21, 24], ana-
lytic connections between premises and conclusions [26] and many other
things. Of all these, we will come back to the explanation of the failure
of Addition in terms of the absence of analytic connections, when we dis-
cuss analytic entailments as modeled by containment logics, in Section 5.
We will, obviously, also come back the epistemic explanation of the fail-
ure of Addition when we spell out Fitting’s epistemic interpretation of
Paracomplete Weak Kleene, in Section 3.3.
Notwithstanding the importance of each of these particular expla-
nations, we can refer to a unifying account of all these treatments of
disjunctions which do not satisfy Addition, proposed by Thomas Fer-
guson in the recent paper [21]. There, Ferguson follows Zimmerman’s
reflections in [56], noting that in many of these accounts the failure of
Addition is explained by disjunction having a conjunctive flavor to it  or
otherwise being nothing more than a conjunction in disguise. The con-
junction in question is formed by the explicitly stated disjunction and
the implicit requirement that both disjuncts satisfy a certain enabling
condition, to be further specified in each interpretation. The failure of
Addition is accounted for, in this way, by noticing that the fact that
one of the disjuncts holds does not guarantee the satisfaction of all the
required constraints. In fact, were some of the disjuncts not to satisfy
the required enabling condition, then the (apparent) disjunction would
not be satisfied  for more on this [see 21, pp. 344–349].
Secondly, regarding the failure of Simplification, various explanations
have also been given, which appeal to the meaninglessness of one of
the conjuncts [32], to a causal, explanatory or otherwise grounding-like
connection between premises and conclusions [41], to regressive ana-
lytic connections between premises and conclusions [41], and many other
things. Of all these, we will come back to the explanation of the failure
of Simplification in terms of the absence of regressive analytic connec-
tions, when we discuss regressive analytic entailments as modeled by
containment logics, in Section 5. We will, again, also come back the
epistemic explanation of the failure of Simplification, when we give a
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our novel epistemic interpretation of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene, in
Section 3.4
Until now no unifying account of all these treatments of conjunctions
which do not satisfy Simplification has been proposed. Whether or not it
is actually possible to do so, is something we do not know and, in fact, an
issue whose discussion will take us probably too far afield. Nevertheless,
we can still point out that our epistemic explanation of the failure of
Simplification will share some features with the account  implicitly 
proposed by Ciuni in [11] to understand the failure of Simplification in
Paraconsistent Weak Kleene, when this system is understood as a logic
devised to handle paradoxes and other semantic pathologies.
There, Ciuni proposed to explain the failure of Simplification in Para-
consistent Weak Kleene by pointing out that, when it is employed as a
logic to handle paradoxes, conjunction has a disjunctive flavor to it 
or otherwise is nothing more than a disjunction in disguise. The dis-
junction in question is formed by the explicitly stated conjunction and
the possibility that either of the conjuncts satisfies a certain overriding
condition: in the particular case he is discussing, that of being a patho-
logical proposition. In this way, were some of the conjuncts to satisfy
this overriding condition, the (apparent) conjunction would be satisfied.
We shall highlight that, as the reader will notice in the sequel, our own
epistemic interpretation of PWK and therefore of the failure of Simplifi-
cation in it, will exhibit a similar pattern  although the ingredients will
be completely different. We will come back to this similarity below, at
the end of Section 3.4.
Having said this, let us now turn to the epistemic interpretation of
the Kleene logics.
3. The Epistemic Interpretation of Kleene logics
In this section we will, first, review Fitting’s epistemic interpretation of
the strong Kleene logic K3 and its four-valued generalization FDE. After
that, we will look at Fitting’s epistemic interpretation of the Paracom-
plete Weak Kleene logic Kw3 and its four-valued generalization Sfde. We
will, finally, advance an epistemic interpretation of Paraconsistent Weak
Kleene logic and its four-valued generalization dSfde, which is novel to
this work.
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3.1. What is an Epistemic Interpretation?
Before jumping to the interpretations themselves, we should explain
what are we trying to do in providing an epistemic interpretation for
the Kleene logics, i.e., what Fitting did and what we will, consequently,
try to do. To briefly answer this question we shall say our aim is to
provide an epistemic reading of the truth-values featured in the cor-
responding Kleene logics, their notion of logical consequence, and the
truth-functions characteristic of these systems.
We will devote Sections 3.2 to 3.4 below to a discussion of the epis-
temic interpretation of the distinctive truth-functions of each of the
strong and weak Kleene logics. Here, we shall talk about what is shared
by the epistemic interpretations of each of these systems, namely, the
reading of the truth-values and the consequence relation at play.
In relation to these, in e.g. [29], Fitting suggests we consider the
following situation. Suppose we have a certain group of experts E whose
opinion we value and whom we are consulting on certain matters, in the
form of a series of yes/no questions. When asking these experts about
a certain proposition ϕ some will say it is true, some will say it is false,
some may be willing to decline expressing and opinion and some may
have reasons for calling it both true and false. Fitting suggests that in
these cases we, correspondingly, assign ϕ a sort of generalized truth-value
v(ϕ) = 〈P,N〉
where P is the set of experts who say ϕ is true, and N is the set of
experts who say ϕ is false [30, p. 57]. Thus, it is possible that P ∪N 6= E
and it is also possible that P ∩N 6= ∅.6
Given this picture, let us now focus on the epistemic reading of the
four truth-values t, ⊤, ⊥, f . These values are usually interpreted 
that is, outside of the epistemic interpretation, e.g. in [47]  as, re-
spectively, true only, both-true-and-false, neither-true-nor-false and false
only. However, in the context of the epistemic reading we are currently
discussing, the assignment of the non-classical values ⊥ and ⊤ to a
certain formula corresponds, respectively, to the case where no expert
6 As Fitting highlights in many places, considerations along these lines already
suggest we are going to end up, down the road, with a lattice-theoretic structure
(called a bilattice) which can be put to very good use for logical investigations. But we
will try not to go into the formal details of the connection between this investigations
and those concerning bilattices, leaving this discussion for another time.
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expresses an opinion towards the formula in question, i.e., to the gen-
eralized truth-value 〈∅, ∅〉, and the case where all experts say that the
formula in question is true, and at the same time they say it is false, i.e.,
to the generalized truth-value 〈E , E〉. In the former case, we might say
they have an indeterminate opinion, and in the latter case we might say
they have an inconsistent opinion.
Similarly, the assignment of the classical values t and f corresponds,
respectively, to the case where all experts say the formula in question
is true and no expert says it is false, i.e., to the generalized truth-value
〈E , ∅〉, and the case where no expert says that the formula is true and
all experts say that the formula is false, i.e., to the generalized truth-
value 〈∅, E〉. Moreover, with regard to the full set of the four generalized
truth-values, we will take the terminological liberty  in alignment with
the previous remarks  of calling t,⊤ and f the determinate values, while
calling t,⊥ and f the consistent values. Thus, to account for the strong
and weak Kleene logics presented above, it is necessary to think that
every time the experts are consulted on a certain proposition ϕ the re-
sulting general opinion can be represented by one of the four truth-values
t,⊤,⊥, f .
This epistemic interpretation of the truth-values t,⊤,⊥, f certainly
puts things under a different light, but it still does not account for an
epistemic understanding of a logic. For that purpose we need to give an
epistemic understanding of the underlying truth-functions of the given
logic (whether it be one of the strong or the weak Kleene ones) and of the
accompanying definition of logical consequence. The latter issue is easier
to settle. Being relatively conservative, in what follows we will always be
taking logical consequence to be somehow related to truth-preservation.
More specifically, by this we mean that an argument will be valid if and
only if whenever the premises are taken to be true by all experts, so is
the conclusion.
The task of giving an epistemic understanding of the strong and the
weak Kleene truth-tables and of their four-valued generalizations will
demand a little bit more work. Fitting achieved this by taking these
truth-functions to embody different approaches to determine what ex-
perts think of certain complex formulae such as ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ ∨ ψ  i.e.,
whether they think they are true or false  given how these experts stand
concerning their components. In a nutshell, we can say that Fitting took
the truth-functions characteristic of each of the Kleene logics discussed
by him, to embody different policies applicable when pooling the opinions
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of the consulted experts. Thus, in what remains of this section we will
be discussing what these difference policies are in the case of the strong
Kleene logics and of the Paracomplete Weak Kleene logic, showing at
last how it is possible to extend this account to provide an epistemic
interpretation of the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene.
3.2. The Epistemic Interpretation of strong Kleene logics
Given the above remarks, the last thing required to provide an epistemic
interpretation of the strong Kleene logics K3 and its four-valued gener-
alization FDE is to clarify which policies for pooling the opinions of the
consulted experts are characteristic of these logics. The unsurprising
answer will be: the most intuitive and straightforward ones.
In fact, concerning a conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ, Fitting says that we should
calculate its generalized truth-value  the pair comprising, first, the set
of experts which think it is true and, second, the set of experts which
think it is false  as follows. On the one hand, it seems intuitive to say
that the experts who believe ϕ ∧ ψ is true are those who believe both ϕ
and ψ are true. That is to say, the set of experts who believe ϕ ∧ ψ is
true can be calculated by taking the intersection of two sets: the set of
experts who think ϕ is true, and the set of experts who think ψ is true.
On the other hand, it also seems intuitive to say that the experts who
believe ϕ ∧ ψ is false are those who believe either ϕ or ψ is false. That
is to say, the set of experts who believe ϕ ∧ ψ is false can be calculated
by taking the union of two sets: the set of experts who think ϕ is false,
and the set of experts who think ψ is false. Fitting proposes to formally
represent this, given two propositions ϕ and ψ whose generalized truth-
values are v(ϕ) = 〈P1, N1〉 and v(ψ) = 〈P2, N2〉, by defining an operation
⊓ between them as
ϕ ⊓ ψ = 〈P1 ∩ P2, N1 ∪N2〉
Analogous reasoning establishes that for the case of a disjunction
ϕ∨ψ, its generalized truth-value should be calculated as follows. On the
one hand, it seems intuitive to say that the experts who believe ϕ ∨ ψ
is true are those who believe ϕ or ψ are true. That is to say, the set of
experts who believe ϕ ∨ ψ is true can be calculated by taking the union
of two sets: the set of experts who think ϕ is true, and the set of experts
who think ψ is true. On the other hand, it also seems intuitive to say
that the experts who believe ϕ∨ψ is false are those and only those who
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believe both ϕ and ψ are false. That is to say, the set of experts who
believe ϕ∨ψ is false can be calculated by taking the intersection of two
sets: the set of experts who think ϕ is false, and the set of experts who
think ψ is false. Fitting proposes to formally represent this, given two
propositions ϕ and ψ whose generalized truth-values are v(ϕ) = 〈P1, N1〉
and v(ψ) = 〈P2, N2〉, by defining an operation ⊔ between them as
7
ϕ ⊔ ψ = 〈P1 ∪ P2, N1 ∩N2〉
Finally, for the case of a negation ¬ϕ, its generalized truth-value
should be calculated by switching the role of the set of experts saying ϕ
is true and the set of experts saying ϕ is false. That is, those experts
who say that ϕ is true, should be counted as saying that ¬ϕ is false,
and those experts saying that ϕ is false should be counted as saying
that ¬ϕ is true. Formally, for a given proposition ϕ whose generalized
truth-value is v(ϕ) = 〈P1, N1〉, Fitting defines the operation ¬ as
¬ϕ = 〈N1, P1〉
Let us now consider the case where every time the experts are con-
sulted on a certain proposition ϕ, the resulting general opinion can be
represented by one of the four truth-values t,⊤,⊥, f . If, in this context,
we were to graphically summarize the outcome of the previous pool-
ing directives concerning negation, conjunction and disjunction, we will
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of Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic FDE, as discussed e.g. in [6, 19]. This
suggests that the above remarks amount to an epistemic interpretation
of Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic.
7 Fitting actually denotes the operations ⊓ and ⊔ with the symbols ∧ and ∨,
respectively. However, in an effort to minimize confusion as much as possible, we
decided to change them in order to differentiate them from the connectives usually
employed to represent conjunction and disjunction. However, this is only a stylistic
choice, and none of the formal results depends on this.
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The question remains, however, of how to use the above consider-
ations to provide an epistemic interpretation for Strong Kleene logic
K3. If we imagine a situation in which all experts are consulted and,
for no proposition ϕ all experts express an inconsistent opinion, this
will amount to restricting the FDE valuations to the “consistent” values:
namely, t,⊥, f . The three-valued logic induced by this restriction is
K3 and it is, thus, through this reflections that Fitting arrived at an
epistemic interpretation for Strong Kleene logic.
Interestingly, this can be further applied to provide an epistemic
interpretation for Priest’s Logic of Paradox LP. In fact, if we imagine
a situation where, for all propositions on which the experts are asked
about, no expert refrains from expressing an opinion, this will amount
to restricting the FDE valuations to the “determinate” values: namely,
t,⊤, f . The three-valued logic rendered by this constraints is, thus, LP 
which, additionally, provides an epistemic interpretation for this inter-
esting Kleene logic. Let us, then, see how a modification of these remarks
may lead to an epistemic interpretation of the weak Kleene logics.
3.3. The Epistemic Interpretation of Paracomplete Weak Kleene
How does Fitting arrive at the desired interpretation of Paracomplete
Weak Kleene? It is only after taking the weak Kleene truth-tables to
summarize a quite distinctive approach to pooling the opinions of the
consulted experts. An approach, that is, which must  in a very sensi-
ble way  diverge from that of the strong Kleene logics reviewed in the
previous subsection.
In fact, in [30] Fitting is quite clear about this, noting that sometimes
we may want to collect and ponder on the opinions of the consulted
experts in special ways. Recall that the framework allows experts to be
silent about certain matters when they are asked about their opinions.
Thus, e.g., when evaluating a conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ or a disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ
we may
want to ‘cut this down’ by considering people who have actually ex-
pressed an opinion on both propositions [ϕ] and [ψ]. [30, pp. 66–67]
Hence, we shall call the resulting alternative conjunctions and disjunc-
tions  following Ferguson in [23] and [25]  the “cut-down variants” of
these logical operations. This has as a result that the “cut-down” way
in which we calculate e.g. the set of experts who believe the conjunction
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ϕ ∧ ψ is true (alternatively, false) requires taking the intersection of set
of experts that we previously classified as saying ϕ ∧ ψ is true (false),
with the set of experts who have actually expressed an opinion towards
both ϕ and ψ. Similarly for a disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ and a negation ¬ϕ. In
these cases, we may say these variants operate within Fitting’s epistemic
interpretation of the Kleene logics, following the motto
no determinate opinion can arise from a set that
includes an indeterminate opinion.
Let us now have a closer look at Fitting’s proposal to formally model
this cut-down approach.
The first step is to define a unary operator  eloquently called a “cut-
down operator”, by Ferguson  which, for a given proposition ϕ outputs
the set of experts who have expressed any determinate opinion whatso-
ever (either positive or negative) towards ϕ. This is done by taking the
union of the experts who said it is true and the set of experts who said
it is false.
This can be rigorously represented with the help of a further oper-
ation on generalized truth-values, called the gullibility or “accept any-
thing” operation ⊕ [see, e.g., 30, p. 56]. Given two propositions ϕ and
ψ, the gullibility operation between them gives as a result a generalized
truth-value where, on the one hand, all who think ϕ or ψ are true are
brought together and, on the other hand, all who think ϕ or ψ are false
are also brought together.
That is to say, the result of calculating the gullibility operation be-
tween ϕ and ψ is a pair, obtained as follows. As the first coordinate,
we have the union of the set of experts who think ϕ is true with the set
of experts who think ψ is true. As the second coordinate, we have the
union of the set of experts who think ϕ is false with the set of experts
who think ψ is false. Speaking more formally, consider two proposi-
tions ϕ and ψ such that their generalized truth-values are, respectively,
v(ϕ) = 〈P1, N1〉 and v(ψ) = 〈P2, N2〉. The gullibility operation applied
to them is defined such that
ϕ⊕ ψ = 〈P1 ∪ P2, N1 ∪N2〉
It is, then, with the aid of this operation that the cut-down [[ϕ]] of a
proposition ϕ, whose generalized truth-value is v(ϕ) = 〈P1, N1〉, can be
defined as
[[ϕ]] = ϕ⊕ ¬ϕ = 〈P1 ∪N1, P1 ∪N1〉
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noting, furthermore, that the only case where [[ϕ]] = 〈∅, ∅〉 is the case
where no expert expressed a determinate opinion towards ϕ corre-
sponding to the assignment of the truth-value ⊥ to ϕ.
The second step to formally model Paracomplete Weak Kleene’s op-
erations in this epistemic setting, is to design, with the help of these tools,
e.g. “cut-down” conjunctions and disjunctions. To accomplish this we
can use the help of yet another operation on generalized truth-values,
called the consensus or “agreement” operation ⊗ [see, e.g., 30, p. 56].
Given two propositions ϕ and ψ, the consensus operation between them
gives as a result a generalized truth-value where, on the one hand, all
those who agree that ϕ and ψ are true are brought together and, on the
other hand, all those who agree that ϕ and ψ are false are also brought
together.
That is to say, the result of calculating the consensus between ϕ and
ψ is a pair, obtained as follows. As the first coordinate, we have the in-
tersection of the set of experts who think ϕ is true with the set of experts
who think ψ is true. As the second coordinate, we have the intersection
of the set of experts who think ϕ is false with the set of experts who think
ψ is false. Speaking more formally, consider two propositions ϕ and ψ
such that their generalized truth-values are, respectively, v(ϕ) = 〈P1, N1〉
and v(ψ) = 〈P2, N2〉. The consensus operation applied to them is defined
such that
ϕ⊗ ψ = 〈P1 ∩ P2, N1 ∩N2〉
It is, then, with the aid of these formal instruments that we are able
to define the target cut-down variants of conjunction and disjunction.
Let us focus, for instance, in the case of conjunction. Fitting indicates
that we ought to take the generalized truth-value of ϕ∧ψ and cut it down
to the set of people who have actually expressed an opinion towards both
ϕ and ψ. In other words, the generalized truth-value of this cut-down
conjunction should be obtained as follows.
On the one hand, we should cut down the set of experts who believe
both ϕ and ψ are true. This can be done by taking the intersection
of set of experts who think both ϕ and ψ are true, with the set of
experts who have actually expressed a determinate opinion towards both
propositions. On the other hand, we should cut down the set of experts
who believe either ϕ or ψ are false. This can be done by taking the
intersection of set of experts who think either ϕ or ψ are false, with
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the set of experts who have actually expressed a determinate opinion
towards both propositions.
Both these moves, together, amount to nothing other than taking
the consensus ⊗ between the set of experts that we previously classified
as saying ϕ∧ψ is true (or false)  i.e. ϕ⊓ψ  and the set of experts who
have actually expressed an opinion towards both ϕ and ψ  i.e., the cut-
downs of ϕ and ψ, namely [[ϕ]] and [[ψ]]. Similar reasoning leads to similar
results for disjunction and negation. More formally, Fitting defines a cut-
down conjunction △ and a cut-down disjunction ▽ as follows, noting that
negation is not altered by these modifications.8
ϕ△ψ = (ϕ ⊓ ψ) ⊗ [[ϕ]] ⊗ [[ψ]] ϕ▽ ψ = (ϕ ⊔ ψ) ⊗ [[ϕ]] ⊗ [[ψ]]
Finally, if the four values t,⊤,⊥, f are taken into account, the “truth-
tables” for the operations of conjunction, disjunction and negation 
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four-valued logic Sfde, depicted in Figure 3 above. Hence, the previ-
ous account can be taken to represent nothing more than an epistemic
interpretation of this four-valued logic.
Of most importance to us, though, is that our discussion of Sfde as
a four-valued generalization of Paracomplete Weak Kleene in Section 2
already suggests how we are going to provide an epistemic interpretation
for Kw3 . Indeed, if we imagine a situation in which experts are consulted,
and for no proposition ϕ all the experts think ϕ is true and all ex-
perts think ϕ is also false, i.e., if all of them have consistent opinions on
absolutely all propositions, this will formally amount to restricting the
valuations of Sfde to the “consistent” values: namely, the truth-values
t,⊥, f . The three-valued logic induced by this restriction will be no other
than Kw3 and it is, therefore, through these remarks that Fitting arrived
at an epistemic interpretation for Paracomplete Weak Kleene.
8 See Fitting [29, p. 67] and Ferguson [23, p. 24], [25, p. 3].
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Let us now illustrate how the failure of Addition is, thus, properly
understood in this framework. Consider, for example, the case where all
experts think ϕ is true and no expert thinks it is false and, simultane-
ously, all experts think ψ is neither true nor false  i.e. v(ϕ) = 〈E , ∅〉 and
v(ψ) = 〈∅, ∅〉. Given our previous considerations, we can equivalently
say that ϕ is assigned the truth-value t, whereas ψ is assigned the truth-
value ⊥. As a result of this, the value of the ‘cut-down’ disjunction
ϕ ▽ ψ will be 〈∅, ∅〉  that is, the epistemic counterpart of ⊥. In other
words, the failure of Addition is understood in this interpretation by
taking disjunction to be a cut-down disjunction. Under such a reading,
it is clear how from e.g. the fact that all experts think ϕ is true it does
not follow that all experts think ϕ∨ψ is true  the reason being that all
experts may have no opinion whatsoever with regard to ψ. Furthermore,
allowing us to establish that in the context of this epistemic interpre-
tation the fact that all experts have an opinion on the given disjuncts
works as the aforementioned “enabling condition” (cf. Section 2) for a
disjunction to be true.
An anonymous referee wondered whether or not under this interpre-
tation we are claiming that ϕ ∨ ψ may be unknown, even if ϕ is true.
That is not what we are claiming. What we have just said is that, if we
want to report which propositions are supported by all experts, and 
additionally  we want to adopt a cut-down policy in providing these
reports, making sure that in such cases all experts have an opinion on
all of the component propositions thereof, then even though all experts
may support ϕ, then we may not regard all experts as supporting ϕ∨ψ.
The reason is that all of them may have no opinion towards ψ.9
In what follows we will be proceeding similarly to arrive at our desired
epistemic interpretation for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene.
3.4. The Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene
Our aim, now is to provide a novel understanding of Paraconsistent
Weak Kleene’s truth-functions by taking them to summarize a distinctive
9 This touches upon the difference between a proposition ϕ being assigned the
truth-value t, which under the current interpretation is to be read as reporting that
“all experts said that ϕ is true, and no expert said that ϕ is false”, and a proposition ϕ
being true simpliciter, i.e., ontologically speaking. Not only are these two properties
different, but additionally we do not even have the means to say that a proposi-
tion is true  ontologically speaking  in the current epistemic interpretation of these
semantics. We elaborate on these issues, in the discussion provided in Section 4.1.
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approach to pooling the opinion of the experts being consulted. This
approach will have to, yet again, diverge quite sensibly not only from
the pooling policies embodied by the strong Kleene logics  but also
from the one embodied by Paracomplete Weak Kleene, discussed in the
previous section.
We will motivate our approach noting that there might be further
special ways in which we might want to collect and ponder on the opin-
ions of the experts. Let us recall, for example, that the general frame-
work outlined by Fitting allows experts to have inconsistent opinions
about certain matters, i.e., some experts may have reasons for calling a
proposition ϕ both true and false.
Thus, e.g. when considering a conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ or a disjunction
ϕ ∨ ψ we may want  in a way that is perfectly dual to Fitting’s sug-
gestions above  to “track down” people who have expressed an incon-
sistent opinion towards either ϕ or ψ. Hence, we shall call the resulting
alternative conjunctions and disjunctions, the “track-down” variants of
these famous logical operations. In these cases, we may say these variant
operate within Fitting’s epistemic interpretation, following the motto
no consistent opinion can arise from a set that
includes an inconsistent opinion
Let us now have a closer look at our proposal to formally model this
track-down approach.
The first step to technically represent these track-down variants, is to
define a unary operator  to be called a “track-down” operator  which,
for a given proposition ϕ outputs the set of experts who have expressed
an inconsistent opinion towards ϕ. This is done by taking the intersec-
tion of the set of experts who said it is true and the set of experts who
said it is false.
This can be formally represented with the help of the consensus op-
eration, letting the track-down ||ϕ|| of a proposition ϕ, whose generalized
truth-value is v(ϕ) = 〈P1, N1〉, be defined as
||ϕ|| = ϕ⊗ ¬ϕ = 〈P1 ∩N1, P1 ∩N1〉
noting, furthermore, that the only case where ||ϕ|| = 〈E , E〉 is the case
where all experts expressed an inconsistent opinion towards ϕ corre-
sponding to the assignment of the truth-value ⊤ to ϕ.
The second step to formally model Paraconsistent Weak Kleene’s
operations in this epistemic setting, is to design, with the help of these
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tools, e.g. “track-down” conjunctions and disjunctions. Let us focus, for
instance, in the case of conjunction. Our previous motivations indicate
we ought to take the generalized truth-value of ϕ ∧ ψ and “track down”
the set of people who have expressed an inconsistent opinion towards
either ϕ or ψ. In other words, the generalized truth-value of this track-
down conjunction should be obtained as follows.
On the one hand, we should collect the set of experts who believe
either ϕ or ψ is false, together with the set of people who have expressed
an inconsistent opinion towards either ϕ or ψ. This can be done by
taking the union of set of experts who think both ϕ and ψ are true, with
the set of experts who have expressed an inconsistent opinion towards
either propositions. On the other hand, we should collect the set of
experts who believe either ϕ or ψ is false, together with the set of people
who have expressed an inconsistent opinion towards either ϕ or ψ. This
can be done by taking the union of set of experts who think either ϕ
or ψ is false, with the set of experts who have expressed an inconsistent
opinion towards either propositions.
Both these moves amount to nothing other than taking the result of
the ⊕ operation between the set of experts that we previously classified
as saying ϕ∧ψ is true (or false)  i.e. ϕ⊓ψ  and the set of experts who
have expressed an inconsistent opinion towards either ϕ or ψ  i.e., the
track-downs of ϕ and ψ, namely ||ϕ|| and ||ψ||. Similar reasoning leads
to similar results for disjunction and negation. More formally, we can
define a track-down conjunction N and a track-down disjunction H as
follows, noticing that negation is not altered by these modifications.
ϕNψ = (ϕ ⊓ ψ) ⊕ ||ϕ|| ⊕ ||ψ|| ϕHψ = (ϕ ⊔ ψ) ⊗ ||ϕ|| ⊗ ||ψ||
Thus, just as in the cut-down case where the set of experts being
considered is shrunk to cover all those experts expressing a determi-
nate opinion on all the relevant propositions, in the track-down case
something similar happens. In fact, in the track-down case the set of
experts being considered is enlarged to cover all those experts expressing
an inconsistent opinion on some of the relevant propositions, hence it is
asked of the pooling procedure not to forget that some people do not
have a consistent opinion towards the issues in question.
Finally, if the four values t,⊤,⊥, f are taken into account, the “truth-
tables” for the operations of conjunction, disjunction and negation 
understood in this “track-down” fashion  would be the following, as is
easy to check.
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of the four-valued logic dSfde, whose truth tables we depicted
in Figure 4 above. Hence, the previous account can be taken to constitute
an epistemic interpretation of this four-valued logic.
Of most importance to us, however, is that our discussion of dSfde as
a four-valued generalization of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene in Section 2
allows us to transition from the above remarks to an epistemic interpre-
tation for PWK. In fact, if we consider a situation in which experts are
consulted, and for no proposition ϕ all experts refrain from expressing
an opinion about it, i.e., if all of them have determinate opinions on
absolutely all propositions, this will formally amount to restricting the
valuations of dSfde to the “determinate” values: namely t,⊤, f . The
three-valued logic induced by this restriction is our target logic PWK. It
is, therefore, through these considerations that we arrive at our desired
epistemic interpretation for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene  thus fulfilling
the main goal of this paper.10
Let us now illustrate, as expected, how the failure of Simplification
is, thus, properly understood in this framework. Consider, for example,
the case where all experts think ϕ is true and at the same time all
experts think it is false, while also all experts think ψ is false and no
expert thinks it is true  i.e. v(ϕ) = 〈E , E〉 and v(ψ) = 〈∅, E〉. Given our
previous considerations, we can equivalently say that ϕ is assigned the
truth-value ⊤, whereas ψ is assigned the truth-value f . As a result of
this, the value of the “track-down” conjunction ϕ N ψ will be 〈E , E〉 
that is, the epistemic counterpart of ⊤. In a nutshell, the failure of
Simplification is understood in this interpretation by taking conjunction
to be a track-down conjunction. Under such a reading, it is clear how
from e.g. the fact that all experts think ϕ ∧ ψ is true it does not follow
that all experts think that ψ is true  the reason being that we may
10 These ideas were formally developed in full extent in [52], were it is shown
that dSfde is the logic of track-down operations on logical bilattices.
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regard all experts as thinking that the conjunction is true because all of
them have an inconsistent opinion concerning ϕ.
We can, furthermore, connect this to our purported understanding
of the failure of Simplification in terms of conjunction being a “disguised
disjunction”, formed by the conjuncts in question and two more disjuncts
representing the possibility that either of the conjuncted propositions
triggers a certain overriding condition. It is clear from the above that the
epistemic interpretation of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene outlined allows
for this reading. In fact, in the context of such an epistemic interpreta-
tion, the fact that all experts have an inconsistent opinion on one of the
given conjuncts works as the aforementioned “overriding condition” (cf.
Section 2) for a conjunction to be true.
The previous reflections put PWK and its four-valued generalization
under a new light with regard to philosophical and logical investigations.
But, speaking of a formal logic, we believe some philosophical achieve-
ments can be made of a broader significance if we can supplement them
with attractive formal results. This is why, below, we devote ourselves to
offer some of these. We present sound and complete two-sided sequent
calculi for the four-valued generalizations of the weak Kleene logics. We
motivate the particular calculi below, by pointing out some results on
the relation between weak Kleene logics and containment logics.
However, before doing this we shall provide a discussion and a com-
parison of the account presented in this paper, with works in the litera-
ture which discuss the relation between many-valued logics and epistemic
concepts. To this we now turn.
4. Related Work
In this section we offer a comparison of some work, present in the litera-
ture about many-valued logics, concerning their relation with epistemic
concepts. These discussions are not meant to be exhaustive, as there
is a great deal of related works which we cannot  for considerations of
space  address with here. What follows should, then, be regarded as
a rather brief overview and comparison of what we have done in the
previous sections, with some works that form a part of the constantly
growing literature on these topics.11
11 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for urging us to comment on
these issues.
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4.1. Epistemic Interpretations and Truth-Functionality
In a number of papers coauthored by Didier Dubois and colleagues, some
deeply interesting observations concerning giving epistemic interpreta-
tions to many-valued logics are thoroughly considered. Prime among
them is the worry that there is some inherent tension between giving an
epistemic interpretation to a many-valued logic, and the logic in question
being truth-functional, as discussed e.g. in [17, 18]. This concern is fur-
ther explained by Dubois’ claim that  when involved in such a project 
the very assumption of truth-functionality is debatable, precisely because
“belief is never truth-functional” [18, p. 195].
Our response to these observations will follow closely the replies for-
mulated by Heinrich Wansing and Nuel Belnap in their recent paper
[55], which addresses the previous concerns, as directed to the “Told
Interpretation” (an epistemic interpretation, indeed) of the logic FDE.
This reading of Belnap-Dunn’s four-valued logic interprets this system
in terms of how a computer should reason when receiving information
from different reliable sources about the semantic status of propositional
variables. This reading takes the values t,⊤,⊥, f to represent, respec-
tively, the situation in which the computer has been told that the given
proposition is true, but has not been told that it is false; the situation in
which the computer has been told that the given proposition is true, and
it has also been told that it is false; the situation in which the computer
has not been told that the given proposition is true, and has not been
told that it is false; and, finally, the situation in which the computer has
not been told that the given proposition is true, but has been told that it
is false. We will see that more or less the majority of the components of
their defense apply to Fitting’s epistemic interpretation, if appropriate
care is taken. As such, their arguments can be turned into a defense
of our interpretation of the weak Kleene logics and, in particular, of
Paraconsistent Weak Kleene.
Dubois’ argument for the non-truth-functionality of belief appears in
many forms in various of his works, and can be reasonably summarized
as follows. As long as ϕ can only be either true or false, even if we
have no information concerning its truth-value or if we have conflicting
information concerning its truth-value, the proposition ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ can be
unmistakably at any time predicted as being false and the proposition
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ can be unmistakably at any time predicted as being true [cf.
18, p. 195]. Regarding all the Kleene logics (the strong and the weak,
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the three- and the four-valued), the upshot of this line of argumentation
appears to be that  as long as they are given an epistemic interpreta-
tion  they will be highly inadequate formalisms. In all of these systems,
the previously referred formulae are not evaluated as Dubois’ remarks
require them to be.
Dubois and his colleagues conclude, then, that the lack of expressive
power of epistemically interpreted truth-functional many-valued logics
suggests the need to look for more appropriate frameworks. In this vein,
epistemic logics appear to provide a more suitable environment. In fact,
with these ideas in mind, Dubois developed epistemic logics designed
to recast the intuitions behind the epistemic interpretation of some of
the Kleene logics. For instance, in [18] the systems MEL and MELC
are presented as epistemic logics “to model reasoning about incomplete
information”, and to model reasoning about incomplete as well as “con-
flicting information”  respectively.12 These are intended to recast, as
epistemic logics, the systems K3 and FDE.
To provide an example of the difference in expressive power between
many-valued logics interpreted epistemically and proper epistemic logics,
let us focus on the case of the three-valued strong Kleene logic. In the
epistemic logic MEL, p is interpreted as “the source claims to know
that p is true” [18, p. 201], and correspondingly ♦p as “the source does
not claim to know that p is false”. Given this, it is possible to provide a
translation Φ of a formula in Kleene logic in terms of a formula in MEL
involving only possibility and necessity as applied to literals. This is
done along the following lines, granted p is a propositional variable [cf.
18, p. 202].
Φ(p) = p Φ(¬p) = ¬p
Φ(ϕ ∧ ψ) = Φ(ϕ) ∧ Φ(ψ) Φ(ϕ ∨ ψ) = Φ(ϕ) ∨ Φ(ψ)
Interestingly, even if both K3 and MEL can represent the fact that
the truth-value of e.g. ϕ is unknown  by 2K3 ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ and 2MEL ϕ ∨
¬ϕ some things are expressible in MEL that are not expressible in
K3. In particular, in the latter it is possible to express e.g. that it is
known that ϕ is either true or false  by MEL (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)  whereas
there is no corresponding expression in K3. This, according to Dubois,
12 While the former can be described as the subjective fragment of the modal
logic KD without nesting, the latter can be understood as the subjective fragment of
the bimodal logic KD2 without nesting. See [18] for more on this.
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witnesses K3’s “lack of expressiveness and inferential power compared to
the proposed epistemic logic” [18, p. 195].
Putting aside the technical comparison with epistemic logics, let us
go back to the conceptual part of Dubois’ argument against the truth-
functionality of belief. It is clear that a particular instantiation of his
argument could be used to criticize the logics considered in the present
paper. However, notice that, as Wansing and Belnap explain in [55,
p. 926], his objection could not be read as requiring that e.g. even if no
expert did express her opinion towards ϕ, it still should be the case that
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is true simpliciter  i.e., ontologically speaking. Or, similarly,
that e.g. even if all experts did express an inconsistent opinion towards
ϕ, it still should be the case that ϕ∨¬ϕ is false  in the ontological sense.
As explained by these authors, this cannot be required precisely because
their epistemic interpretation  and, we may add, also Fitting’s interpre-
tation  of the Kleene logics does not have a mix of truth-values, some of
which are epistemically interpreted and some of which are ontologically
interpreted. All truth-values are epistemically interpreted.
Thus, in the “Told Interpretation” of FDE assigning a proposition the
truth-value t means that the computer has been told that the formula
is true, or that it has arrived at the conclusion that the formula is true,
given what it has been told about the component formulae. Through
analogous reasoning we may conclude that in Fitting’s epistemic inter-
pretation of the Kleene logics, assigning a proposition the truth-value t
means that all of the experts have reported thinking that the formula
is true and none has reported to think it is false, or that it is possible
to arrive at such a conclusion, given what the experts have reported
to think about the component formulae.13 With Wansing and Belnap,
then, we may argue that we cannot be required to say that a formula
is true (or false) ontologically speaking, because in the context of these
epistemic interpretations these truth-values “are just not available” [55,
p. 926].
Therefore, Dubois’ objection against the truth-functionality of the
epistemic interpretation of the Kleene logics should be posed against
these accounts in a different way instead. For example, by stating that
13 As discussed in a footnote to Section 3.3, it is in this sense that  for instance 
the failure of Addition in e.g. Kw3 should not be interpreted in terms of having a true
disjunct without a true disjunction. This is mainly due to the fact that the assignment
of the truth-value t cannot be read in this ontological way, in the context of the
outlined epistemic interpretation.
302 Damian E. Szmuc
e.g. even if no expert did express her opinion towards ϕ, it is still true
that all experts believe in the truth of ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. Similarly, by saying that
e.g. even if all experts did express an inconsistent opinion towards ϕ, it
is still true that all experts believe in the falsity of ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. However,
since this is not what happens in the truth-functional semantics outlined
above, there is something wrong.
But, then again, we must reply that this cannot be required, as the
truth-values of the Kleene logics are not meant to be interpreted in terms
of belief states  but merely in terms of information states, in the sense
of data records [55, p. 924]. Thus, if e.g. the computer has been told
that a given proposition is true and has also been told that it is false
then this does not imply that either the computer or we as users are
bound to believe that the proposition is in fact both true and false. In
the same way, if e.g. all experts say a given proposition is true and that,
at the same time, all experts say the given proposition is false then this
does not imply that either these experts or we are bound to believe the
proposition is in fact both true and false. All that this means is that we
have received the information, provided by the corresponding sources,
that the proposition is true and false. Put it differently, our assignment
of the corresponding truth-value to the proposition corresponds to a
faithful labeling of the recorded data. Thus, truth-values are not to
be interpreted in terms of belief states in the context of the epistemic
interpretations of the Kleene logics  be it the one due to Belnap, or in
the one due to Fitting. Realizing this seems to dissolve the criticism.
But then  an objector might insist  we could still ask the semantics
to evaluate formulae in such a way that, regardless of the information
received about ϕ, it is always the case that e.g. the computer has not
been told that ϕ∧ ¬ϕ it is true and that it has been told it is false, and
similarly that the computer has been told that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is true and that
it has not been told that it is false. And, analogously, that regardless
of the opinion expressed by the consulted experts towards ϕ, we should
always report that no expert thinks ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is true and that all of them
think it is false, and at the same time that we should always report that
all experts think ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is true and none think it is false.
However, as Wansing and Belnap state in their reply to this con-
straints, in [55, p. 926], these evaluation requirements seem to be in-
accurate. For what is worth, such an interpretation would not model
reasoning based on the received, recorded, or stored information. This
applies both to the epistemic interpretation due to Belnap, as well as
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to the interpretation due to Fitting. In answering its questions, the
computer is to reply strictly in terms of what it has been told. Thus,
it seems inappropriate for the computer to report that it has been told
that e.g. ϕ∨¬ϕ is true and that it has not been told that it is false, when
it has not been told anything about ϕ. In the same way, in reporting
what the experts think, Fitting’s interpretation requires us to gather the
information strictly in terms of what the experts have reported thinking.
Thus, it seems off limits for us to report that e.g. all experts think ϕ∨¬ϕ
is true and none thinks it is false, if all experts refrained from expressing
an opinion towards ϕ. Therefore, just as the computer is set to answer
in terms of what it has been told and not in terms of what it could be
programmed to answer, we are bound to report the experts’ opinion in
terms of the opinions actually expressed by the experts and not in terms
of what we could be required to answer. In Dubois’ words, the role of the
semantics is “not to interpret the information provided by the sources,
but just to store it.” [18, p. 205].
These reflections, taken together, explain why the allegations against
the truth-functionality of the Kleene logics do not  after all  strike a
final blow against giving them an epistemic interpretation.
4.2. Orthopairs
Throughout many papers coauthored by Jonathan Lawry and collabo-
rators, an interesting semantics using mathematical structures referred
to as orthopairs, is presented. Interestingly, much like the previously
discussed semantics due to Fitting, orthopair semantics also work with
pairs of sets to account for three- and four-valued logics. In what follows,
we will compare some formal aspects of orthopairs with the previous
technical approaches to the semantics of Kleene logics.
By an orthopair we mean a pair 〈P,N〉 of disjoint subsets of propo-
sitional variables P,N ⊆ Var such that P ∩ N = ∅. Thus, orthopairs
can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with three-valued valu-
ations. By this we mean that each three-valued valuation v induces
an orthopair 〈Pv, Nv〉 and each orthopair 〈P,N〉 induces a three-valued
valuation v〈P,N〉, as follows [cf. 10, p. 1867].
Pv = {p ∈ Var | v(p) = t}









t if p ∈ P
f if p ∈ N
⊥ if p ∈ Var \ (P ∪N)
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Additionally, Lawry and his collaborators also suggest understanding
an orthopair 〈P,N〉 in terms of an epistemic state, associating the propo-
sitional variables in P and N to those propositions, respectively, known
to be true, and known to be false  later associating the propositional
variables in Var \ (P ∪N) to those propositions for which the agent has
no knowledge [10, p. 1870].
In a similar vein, if we lift the restriction that P and N are disjoint
from the definition of an orthopair, we get the more general notion of a
paraconsistent orthopair which can, in turn, be put into a bijection with
four-valued valuations.14 In fact, each four-valued valuation v induces
an orthopair 〈Pv, Nv〉 and each paraconsistent orthopair 〈P,N〉 induces
a four-valued valuation v〈P,N〉, as follows [10, p. 1877]:
Pv = {p ∈ Var | v(p) = t or v(p) = ⊤}













t if p ∈ P and p /∈ N
f if p ∈ N and p /∈ P
⊤ if p ∈ P and p ∈ N
⊥ if p ∈ Var \ (P ∪N)
Analogously, paraconsistent orthopairs 〈P,N〉 can be seen in terms
of a fusion of the consistent epistemic states of two conflicting agents,
letting one of the agents have an epistemic state represented by the or-
thopair 〈P,N\P 〉 and the other agent have an epistemic state represented
by the orthopair 〈P\N,N〉 [10, p. 1877].
In Lawry’s words, given orthopairs allow for a representation in terms
of epistemic states “it is natural to compare them in terms of their
respective amount of information” [10, p. 1880]. In this respect, the
authors consider a number of different orderings which  they show 
have a close relation with many of the Kleene logics. First among them,
is the so-called truth-ordering ≤t intended to express that an orthopair
makes propositional variables “more true” than another. This relation,
defined as
〈P1, N1〉 ≤t 〈P2, N2〉 ⇐⇒ P1 ⊆ P2 and N2 ⊆ N1
14 These authors differentiate orthopairs and paraconsistent orthopairs also in
notation, usually denoting the former by 〈P, N〉 and the latter by 〈F, G〉. However,
for the sake of making the presentation more readable, we will not be adopting this
disambiguation here.
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It has its corresponding meet and join operations ⊓t and ⊔t which 
when understood as operations on {t,⊤,⊥, f}  coincide with Fitting’s
operations ⊓ and ⊔ defined above. As such, they provide yet another
interpretation of the truth-functions of the strong Kleene logics.
Another interesting relation on orthopairs considered by these au-
thors is the information ordering ≤I , defined as
〈P1, N1〉 ≤I 〈P2, N2〉 ⇐⇒ P1 ⊆ P2 and N1 ⊆ N2
It also has its corresponding meet meet and join operations ⊓I and ⊔I
which, yet again  when understood as operations on {t,⊤,⊥, f}  co-
incide with Fitting’s operation ⊗ and ⊕ defined above.
In this regard, it is instructive to compare Fitting’s reading of these
operations in terms of consensus and gullibility operations, with Lawry’s
reading of these operations as pessimistic and optimistic combinations.
He considers that the former represents a pessimistic combination “as it
only retains what both orthopairs hold as being true or false”, resulting in
an epistemic state that is less informative than the epistemic states being
combined [10, p. 1880]; whereas he considers that the latter represents
an optimistic combination “as it retains what at least one orthopair
holds as being true or false”, resulting in an epistemic state that is more
informative than the epistemic states being combined [10, p. 1881].
Lawry’s work is also attractive because it puts forward a new con-
sensus operation  entirely different from the one discussed by Fitting.
This new operation can be intuitively described as a consistent fusion of
the epistemic states of two conflicting agents. To this extent, this way of
getting a consensus requires a subsidiary operation that allows to  so to
say  prepare the epistemic states of the conflicting agents, so that they
can be consistently fused. This auxiliary notion, called the difference
operation in [37] is denoted by ⊖ and is defined as follows
〈P1, N1〉 ⊖ 〈P2, N2〉 = 〈P1\N2, N1\P2〉
It can be conceptually described as a contraction operation, used to
eliminate the discrepancies between the conflicting orthopairs or epis-
temic states, prior to merging  by eliminating conflicting propositional
variables. Given this, the new consensus operation ⊙ is defined as follows
〈P1, N1〉 ⊙ 〈P2, N2〉 = 〈(P1\N2) ∪ (P2\N1), (N1\P2) ∪ (N2\P1)〉
This suggests two further projects that can be carried out, drawing
inspiration from the previous remarks. First, it would be interesting
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to investigate the alternative cut- and track-down operations defined
out of switching Fitting’s consensus operation  in all of the definitions
featured in Section 3  by Lawry’s new consistent consensus operation.
Secondly, in [10, p. 1884] Lawry and others remark that their new con-
sensus operations eliminates the difference between the conflicting or-
thopairs before merging them, in the sense of merging the information
contained in them  by taking their information-theoretic disjunction,
i.e. 〈P1, N1〉 ⊙ 〈P2, N2〉 = (〈P1, N1〉 ⊖ 〈P2, N2〉) ⊔I (〈P2, N2〉 ⊖ 〈P1, N1〉).
However, it would be intriguing to explore what different consensus op-
erations arise from eliminating the differences between the conflicting
orthopairs and then merging them, in the sense of taking the truth-
theoretic disjunction.
Finally, one of the most salient aspects of a comparison between Fit-
ting’s and Lawry’s formalism to provide semantics for three- and four-
valued logics relies in the way the weak Kleene operations are modeled.
In particular, the three-valued Paracomplete weak Kleene logic was in-
terpreted, in Section 3.4, according to Fitting’s cut-down operations.
Differing from this, Lawry shows that these three-valued operations can
be understood in an alternative way, if we focus on certain operations
defined out of the two new orderings on orthopairs ≤P and ≤N , defined
below
〈P1, N1〉 ≤P 〈P2, N2〉 ⇐⇒ P1 ⊆ P2 and P1 ∪N1 ⊆ P2 ∪N2
〈P1, N1〉 ≤N 〈P2, N2〉 ⇐⇒ N1 ⊆ N2 and P1 ∪N1 ⊆ P2 ∪N2
As explained by the authors, “these relations are one-sided in the
sense that the negative and positive literals do not play the same role.
In one case, we keep the inclusion condition on the negative part of the
orthopair and on the positive part in the other case” [10, p. 1881]. While
the relation ≤P is intended to represent the idea of “at least as positive,
and no less informative than”, the relation ≤N is intended to represent
the idea of “at least as negative, and no less informative than”.
One of the most salient results is, then, that the meet operations ⊓P
and ⊓N coincide  when understood as operations on {t,⊥, f}  with
Fitting’s cut-down operations △ and ▽, respectively (for more on how to
translate these operations on orthopairs into operations on truth-values
see [10, p. 1882]). This, already, means that Lawry’s work allows for
a different, alternative, interpretation of the weak Kleene operations in
terms of one-sided orderings. But, furthermore, this means that it is
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also possible to ask if this result extends to the four-valued case  that
is, understanding ⊓P and ⊓N as operations on {t,⊤,⊥, f}. Luckily,
simple calculations show they do, still, coincide with Fitting’s cut-down
opeartions, leading us to conclude that they can be legitimately regarded
as at least as plausible formalizations of the weak Kleene operations as
Fitting’s.
To conclude this section, and given these positive results, the ques-
tion imposes itself regarding whether or not it is possible to define new
different orderings on orthopairs whose meet or joint operations coincide
with our track-down operations N and H when understood as opera-
tions on {t,⊤,⊥, f}. If the answer is positive, then once more Lawry’s
work will have shown its fruitfulness, for it will allow us to provide a dif-
ferent alternative interpretation of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene’s truth-
functions. We leave this hugely intriguing open problem here, hoping to
investigate it in future work.
5. Sequent Calculi
In what follows we will endow the previously discussed four-valued gener-
alizations of the weak Kleene logics with suitable Gentzen-style sequent
calculi.
Before moving on, let us notice that natural deduction calculi have
been recently offered for the weak Kleene logics and some of their four-
valued generalizations. Indeed, these were introduced for Kw3 and PWK in
[44], for Sfde in [45], and for some subsystems thereof in [46].
15 Although
a similar presentation can be carried out for dSfde, for matters of space
we focus here on Gentzen-style sequent calculi for this logic, leaving the
investigation of a natural deduction calculus for it for another occasion.
To arrive at our desired sequent calculi, we will draw inspiration from
the techniques introduced by Coniglio and Corbalán in [13] to provide
calculi of this kind for the systems PWK and Kw3 . The main feature of
such proof systems is that they are obtained by taking an appropriate
sequent calculus for Classical Logic, and applying different restrictions to
the operational rules featured in it. More particularly, these restrictions
pertain to some inclusion requirements between the set of propositional
15 In particular, [46] presents natural deduction calculi for the logics Kw4b and K
w
4n
referred in [51], respectively, as Leb' and Lb'e.
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variables of the active formulae of the corresponding rules, and the set
of propositional variables appearing in some of the side formulae.
The main reason for requiring the rules to comply with these pro-
visos is that weak Kleene logics happen to be closely connected with a
family of systems whose valid inferences enjoy certain variable inclusion
features. This family of systems, denominated containment logics e.g. in
[49], gathers logics where an inference holds only if certain set-theoretic
containment principle holds between the set of propositional variables
appearing in the premises and the set of propositional variables appear-
ing in the conclusion.16
Thus, Coniglio and Corbalán arrived at sequent calculi for PWK and
Kw3 by noticing that these weak Kleene logics can be described as being
pretty close  in a sense to be made precise below  to containment sub-
systems of Classical Logic. By following a similar path, we will arrive
at sequent calculi for dSfde and Sfde, by noticing that these logics can
be rightfully described as proper containment subsystems of some other
Kleene logics. To accomplish this, we will benefit from connecting weak
Kleene logics, in general, with containment logics, later looking at these
four-valued systems as an instance of a more general phenomenon.
5.1. Connecting weak Kleene logics and Containment logics
Let var(Γ ) represent the set of propositional variables appearing in the
set of formulae Γ , allowing us to refer e.g. to var({ϕ}) and var({ϕ, ψ})
as var(ϕ) and var(ϕ, ψ), respectively.
A very well-known family of containment logics  which we will refer
to as Parry logics  are such that all its valid inferences enjoy a property
we may call the -Parry Principle, i.e., the property that
Γ  ϕ only if var(ϕ) ⊆ var(Γ )
Indeed, a species of Parry’s Proscriptive Principle discussed in [43],
applied to entailment.17 Thus, logics satisfying the -Parry Principle
clearly inavalidate Addition  i.e. ϕ  ϕ ∨ ψ  for it may well happen
that the propositional variables appearing in ψ are not included among
those appearing in ϕ.
16 Some important works revolving around these systems are e.g. [1, 12, 22, 27,
41, 42, 43, 50], among others.
17 In fact, [22] calls it -Proscriptive Principle. There is nothing substantial in
the choice of denomination here, though.
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Systems of this sort have been studied, discussed and advanced by
logicians such as Angell [1], Fine [27], Paoli [41], Epstein [20], Correia [14]
and Ferguson [24]  alongside, of course, Parry [43] himself  with the
specific aim of modelling analytic entailments. An analytic connection
between premises and conclusion holds, these authors claim, when the
content of the conclusion is included in the content of the premises.
Indeed, e.g. [1] and [33] understand a logical behavior of this sort as
extending Kant’s notion of analyticity, according to which the predicate
is included in the subject, to also apply to arguments. When the content
of a given complex formula is obtained by collecting the content of the
propositional variables appearing in it, it is straightforward to see how
the requirement that an entailment is analytic directly implies the failure
of Addition  for, in this sense, the content of ϕ∨ψ is usually not taken
to be included in the content of ϕ.
However, notwithstanding the fact that -Parry logics invalidate Ad-
dition, it is not true that all systems where Addition is invalid are -
Parry logics. In fact, Paracomplete Weak Kleene logic attests to this.
For Explosion  i.e., the inference ϕ,¬ϕ  ψ  is valid in it, but does not
enjoy the -Parry property. This can be generalized, as the following
characterization of logical consequence in Kw3 shows.





Γ CL ϕ and var(ϕ) ⊆ var(Γ ), or
Γ CL ∅
Thus, we can say that Kw3 is close to a containment subsystem of
Classical Logic. In fact, letting the -Parry fragment of a logic L, denoted
LPP , be defined such that
Γ L
PP
ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ L ϕ and var(ϕ) ⊆ var(Γ )
it can be observed that the only thing standing between the -Parry
fragment of Classical Logic (i.e. CLPP) and Paracomplete Weak Kleene
are the Kw3 -valid inferences involving inconsistent premises.
18
Interestingly, in [22] it is pointed out how to obtain -Parry logics,
taking Kw3 as a starting point. Let us say that a logic L = 〈FOR(L),L〉
has anti-theorems if there is some ψ ∈ FOR(L) such that ψ L ∅. Then,
18 For an extensive discussion of CLPP , its relation to Parry logics and weak
Kleene logics, see [22].
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a connection between weak Kleene logics and -Parry logics can be es-
tablished by the following general result.
Proposition 5.2 ([22]). Let L be a language and let M = 〈V,D,O〉
be an L-matrix such that V \ D contains an infectious value. If L =
〈FOR(L),M〉 has no anti-theorems, then L is a -Parry logic.
Notice first that this explicitly appeals to subsystems of Paracom-
plete Weak Kleene, as every logic induced by a matrix M = 〈V,D,O〉
such that V \ D contains an infectious value is a subsystem of Kw3 . Note,
moreover, that in light of this observation it is sufficient to consider cer-
tain paraconsistent subsystems of Paracomplete Weak Kleene to arrive
at a -Parry logic. It is in this sense that, in [22] and [21] the four-valued
logic Sfde  which is both a paraconsistent logic and a subsystem of K
w
3 
is described as the -Parry fragment of Priest’s Logic of Paradox.
Observation 5.3 ([22]). For all sets of formulae Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Γ Sfde ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ LP ϕ and var(ϕ) ⊆ var(Γ )
Now, moving on to the relation that Paraconsistent Weak Kleene
and subsystems thereof have with containment logics, we will highlight
that just as we connected containment logics to systems where Addition
fails, we can do the same with systems where Simplification fails. Let us
consider another family of containment logics  to which we will refer as
Dual Parry logics  such that all its valid inferences enjoy a property we
may call the -Dual Parry Principle, i.e., the property that
Γ L ϕ only if ∃Γ
′ ⊆ Γ, Γ ′ 6= ∅, var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(ϕ)
which is a clear dualization of the -Parry Principle, arrived at by revers-
ing the direction of the famous containment principle discussed before.19
Thus, logics satisfying the -Dual Parry Principle saliently invalidate
Simplification  i.e. ϕ∧ψ  ψ  for it may well happen that the proposi-
tional variables appearing in ϕ are not included among those appearing
in ψ.
Systems of this sort have been considered by e.g. Epstein [20] and
Paoli [41] with the specific aim of modeling what the latter calls regressive
19 In [16], [20] and [41], similar properties have been called, respectively, Converse
Parry Property, Dual Dependence and Regressive Analiticity. Yet again, there is
nothing substantial going on in the choice of denomination here  but for a criticism
of the terminology employed in [16], see [35, p. 176, fn. 20].
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analytic entailments. A regressive analytic connection between premises
and conclusions is holds when we
proceed from simple ingredients (simple ideas as primitive concepts,
simple propositions as axioms), down to more complex ones; by ana-
lyzing a derived concept or a theorem, we can overturn the procedure
and regress to the basic components. [41, p. 2]
Hence, this seemingly gives regressive analytic entailments a sort of ex-
planatory flavor, the symptom of which appears to be the complexity
increase (or stability) from premises to conclusions [41, p. 2]. Yet again,
if we apply these ideas to the content of premises and conclusions, and
then obtain the content of complex expressions by collecting those of the
propositional variables appearing in it, it is straightforward to see how
the requirement that an inference is regressive analytic directly implies
the failure of Simplification  for, in this sense, the content of ϕ ∧ ψ is
usually not taken to be included in the content of ψ.20
Again, notwithstanding the fact that -Dual Parry systems invalidate
Simplification, it is not true that all logics that invalidate Simplification
are -Dual Parry systems. Indeed, Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic
attests to this. For Implosion  i.e., the inference ψ  ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is valid
in it, although this inference does not enjoy the -Dual Parry property.
This can be generalized, as the following characterization of logical con-
sequence in PWK shows.
Observation 5.4 ([12]). For all sets of formulae Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Γ PWK ϕ ⇐⇒
{
Γ CL ϕ and ∃Γ ′ ⊆ Γ, Γ ′ 6= ∅, var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(ϕ), or
∅ CL ϕ
Thus, we can say that PWK is close enough to a containment sub-
system of Classical Logic. In fact, letting the -Dual Parry fragment of
a logic L, denoted LDPP , be defined such that
Γ L
DPP
ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ L ϕ and ∃Γ
′, ∅ 6= Γ ′ ⊆ Γ, var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(ϕ)
20 Moreover  as is also argued in [41]  consequence relations enjoying this fea-
ture have been motivated by those who favor the idea that the entailments have
some causal or grounding flavor to it, as e.g. in [8], which would explain that simple
constituents entail some of the compounds they constitute, but not the other way
around.
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it can be observed that the only thing standing between the -Dual
Parry fragment of Classical Logic (i.e. CLDPP) and Paraconsistent Weak
Kleene are the PWK-valid inferences involving tautlogical conclusions.
Interestingly, by a dualization of [22, Observation 1] advanced in [51,
p. 297], it can be pointed out how to obtain -Dual Parry logics, taking
PWK as a starting point. Let us say that a logic L = 〈FOR(L),L〉
has theorems if there is some ψ ∈ FOR(L) such that ∅ L ψ. Then, a
connection between weak Kleene logics and -Dual Parry logics can be
established by the following general observation.
Proposition 5.5. Let L be a language and let M = 〈V,D,O〉 be an
L-matrix such that D contains an infectious value. If L = 〈FOR(L),M〉
has no theorems, then L is a -Dual Parry logic.
Proof. Assume all of the antecedent conditions hold and suppose, for
reductio, that L is not a -Dual Parry logic. This implies there is an
inference Γ M ϕ such that it is not true that ∃Γ ′ ⊆ Γ, Γ ′ 6= ∅, var(Γ ′) ⊆
var(ϕ). This implies that for all γ ∈ Γ , var(γ) * var(ϕ).
Let Σ \∆ be the result of subtracting from Σ all the elements that
are in ∆. Since L has no theorems, moreover, we can assume that there
is a valuation v such that v(ϕ) /∈ D. Let us refer to the infectious value
contained in D as x. We can construct a valuation v∗ such that
v∗(p) =
{
x if p ∈ var(Γ ) \ var(ϕ)
v(p) otherwise
Since, by the above, we are justified to assume that for all γ ∈ Γ , var(γ)\
var(ϕ) 6= ∅, we know that for all γ ∈ Γ , there is a q ∈ var(γ)\var(ϕ) such
that v∗(q) = x. Hence, for all γ ∈ Γ , v∗(γ) = x ∈ D, further implying
that v∗[Γ ] ⊆ D, while at the same time v∗(ϕ) /∈ D. Then, v∗ witnesses
that Γ 2M ϕ, which contradicts our initial assumption. Therefore, L is
a -Dual Parry logic.
Notice first that this explicitly appeals to subsystems of Paracon-
sistent Weak Kleene, as every matrix logic induced by a matrix M =
〈V,D,O〉 such that D contains an infectious value is a subsystem of PWK.
Note, moreover, that in light of this observation it is sufficient to con-
sider certain paracomplete subsystems of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene to
arrive at a -Dual Parry logic. Thus, as a consequence of these remarks
and those made in [51], the four-valued logic dSfde  which is both a
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paracomplete logic and a subsystem of PWK  can be regarded as the
-Dual Parry fragment of Strong Kleene logic.
Observation 5.6. For all sets of formulae Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Γ dSfde ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ K3 ϕ and ∃Γ
′, ∅ 6= Γ ′ ⊆ Γ, var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(ϕ)
Proof. That Γ dSfde ϕ implies Γ K3 ϕ is established by the fact that
dSfde is a subsystem of K3, established in [51], it being easy to check
this by looking at their matrices. That Γ dSfde ϕ implies ∃Γ
′, ∅ 6= Γ ′ ⊆
Γ, var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(ϕ) follows from Proposition 5.5 above.
Finally, having looked at the systems dSfde and Sfde as containment
subsystems of Strong Kleene logic and Priest’s Logic of Paradox, re-
spectively, we will now move on to present their corresponding sequent
calculi. As advertised, these will be obtained by imposing certain ap-
propriate containment provisos to the operational rules of appropriate
Gentzen-style sequent calculi for K3 and LP.
5.2. Definitions
Definition 5.7. By a sequent Γ ∆ we mean an ordered pair 〈Γ,∆〉 of
(non-simultaneously empty) finite sets of formulae of FOR(L).21
Definition 5.8. Let L be a matrix logic L = 〈FOR(L),M〉 such that
M = 〈D,V,O〉. An M valuation v satisfies a sequent Γ ∆ (symbolized
v M Γ ∆) if and only if v(γ) ∈ D for all γ ∈ Γ , then v(δ) ∈ D for
some δ ∈ ∆. A sequent Γ  ∆ is valid (symbolized M Γ  ∆) if for
every M valuation v, v  Γ ∆
Thus, we may interchangeably refer to an inference or sequent Γ ∆
which is valid in the logic L = 〈FOR(L),M〉 as Γ M A or M Γ ∆.
Recall, also, that in such cases we may alternatively denote M as L.
22
21 Note that, since we are working with sequents built from sets, the Contraction
and Exchange rules are going to be built into the system, and no explicit mention of
them is going to be necessary.
22 Notice, that in dealing with sequent calculi we are moving from consequence
relations relating sets of premises with a single conclusion, to consequence relations
relating sets of premises with multiple conclusions. Our discussion was carried out
in the former setting, but can be understood in terms of the latter, and so there is
nothing worrisome in this.
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of R and for every M valuation v, if v M Σ  Π for
every Σ Π ∈ r, then v M Γ ∆
Definition 5.10 ([13]). The sequent calculus GCL contains the following
rules.23
















Γ, ϕ, ψ ∆
Γ,ϕ ∧ ψ ∆
[∧L]
Γ  ϕ,∆ Γ  ψ,∆
Γ  ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
[∧R]
Γ, ϕ ∆ Γ,ψ ∆
Γ,ϕ ∨ ψ ∆
[∨L]
Γ  ϕ, ψ,∆
Γ  ϕ ∨ ψ,∆
[∨R]
Proposition 5.11 ([13]). Let Γ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae
of L. Γ ∆ is provable in GCL if and only if CL Γ ∆.







Γ,¬ϕ ∆ Γ,¬ψ ∆
Γ,¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∆
[¬∧L]
Γ  ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆
Γ  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), ∆
[¬∧R]
Γ,¬ϕ,¬ψ ∆
Γ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∆
[¬∨L]
Γ  ¬ϕ,∆ Γ  ¬ψ,∆
Γ  ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ), ∆
[¬∨R]
Observation 5.13. The rules [¬¬L], [¬∧L], [¬∨L], [¬¬R], [¬∧R], [¬∨R]
are admissible in GCL.
Definition 5.14 ([2]). Let the calculus GK3 be the result of subtracting
the rule [¬R] and adding the De Morgan rules to GCL. Let the calculus
23 Coniglio and Corbalán call this system C, but for matters of uniformity we
will adopt the name GCL, since it gives a more suggestive idea that we are working
with a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for CL.
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GLP bet he result of subtracting the rule [¬L] and adding the De Morgan
rules to GCL.24
Theorem 5.15 ([2]). Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae of
L. Γ ∆ is provable in GK3 if and only if K3 Γ ∆.
Theorem 5.16 ([2]). Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae of
L. Γ ∆ is provable in GLP if and only if LP Γ ∆.
Theorem 5.17 ([2]). Let Γ ∪∆ be finite non-empty set of formulae of L.
The sequent Γ ∆ is provable in GK3, then there is a Cut-free derivation
of it. Similarly for GLP.
Definition 5.18 ([13]). Let the calculus GPWK result from GCL minus
the rules [∧R] and [∧L], and the additional restriction that the rule [¬L]
24 Let us clarify a number of things. First, the sequent calculus for LP is presented
by [5] without a proper name, hence we call it GLP here. The sequent calculus for
K3 is not presented in [5], but it is pointed out that it should be constructed this
way, which is done in e.g. [31]  although in [31] the axioms only feature literals, i.e.,
propositional variables or their negations, which is again inessential given the rest of
the rules. Secondly, in [5] and [31], these calculi are presented with both the left and
right Weakening rules being absorbed into the axioms. There is nothing substantial
to this, given in the context of a calculus satisfying [Cut], both sets of rules are
interderivable. Thirdly, both in the context of [5] and [31], the calculi for LP and K3
are taken as the result of subtracting from GCL both negation rules [¬L] and [¬R]
and adding, alongside with the De Morgan rules, the axioms (which can be traced
back to [2]) we call [Exhaustion] and [Exclusion], respectively
Γ  ϕ, ¬ϕ, ∆
[Exhaustion]
Γ, ϕ, ¬ϕ  ∆
[Exclusion]
However, this difference in presentation is inessential. For, in the context of a
calculus satisfying [Id], [WL], [WR] and [Cut], on the one hand [Exhaustion] and [¬R]
are interderivable and, on the other, [Exclusion] and [¬L] are interderivable. This can
be seen by the following derivations
Γ, ϕ  ∆ Γ  ϕ, ¬ϕ, ∆
[Exhaustion]




Γ, ϕ  ϕ
[WL]
Γ, ϕ  ϕ, ∆
[WR]
Γ  ϕ, ¬ϕ, ∆
[¬R]






Γ, ϕ  ϕ
[WL]
Γ, ϕ  ϕ, ∆
[WR]
Γ, ϕ, ¬ϕ ∆
[¬L]
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must comply with the proviso that var(ϕ) ⊆ var(∆)  in which case, we
will call this rule [¬HL].25
Definition 5.19 ([13]). Let the calculus GKw3 result from GCL minus
the rules [∨R] and [∨L], and the additional restriction that the rule
[¬R] must comply with the proviso that var(ϕ) ⊆ var(Γ )  in which
case, we will call this rule [¬BR].26
Theorem 5.20 ([13]). Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae
of L. Γ ∆ is provable in GPWK if and only if PWK Γ ∆.
Theorem 5.21 ([13]). Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae
of L. Γ ∆ is provable in GKw3 if and only if Kw3 Γ ∆.
Theorem 5.22 ([13]). Let Γ ∪∆ be finite non-empty set of formulae of
L. If the sequent Γ ∆ is provable in GPWK, then there is a Cut-free
derivation of it. Similarly for GKw3 .
Let us now turn to the calculi GdSfde and GSfde for the four-valued
generalizations of PWK and Kw3 , i.e. dSfde and Sfde. Their presentation is
heavily inspired in the above discussed calculi presented in [13] for PWK
and Kw3  where they are properly discussed as the {¬,∧,∨}-fragment of
Halldén’s and Bochvar’s logics of nonsense, respectively.
Definition 5.23. Let the calculus GdSfde result from GK3, adding the re-
strictions that the rule [¬L] must comply with the proviso that var(ϕ) ⊆
var(∆), and the rules [∧L] and [¬∨L] must comply with the proviso that
var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(∆)  in which case, we will call these rules [¬HL], [∧HL]
and [¬∨HL].
Definition 5.24. Let the calculus GSfde result from GLP, adding the re-
strictions that the rule [¬R] must comply with the proviso that var(ϕ) ⊆
var(Γ ), and the rules [∨R] and [¬∧R] must comply with the proviso that
var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(Γ )  in which case, we will call these rules [¬BR], [∨BR]
and [¬∧BR].
25 Coniglio and Corbalán call this system H3, but for matters of uniformity we
will adopt the name GPWK, since it gives a more suggestive idea that we are working
with a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for PWK.
26 Coniglio and Corbalán call this system B3 but, yet again, for matters of uni-
formity we will adopt the name GKw3 , since it gives a more suggestive idea that we
are working with a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for Kw3 .
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5.3. Soundness and Completeness for GdSfde
In what follows we prove the soundness and completeness results for the
sequent calculus GdSfde. For soundness, the proof is standard, by the
usual means.
Lemma 5.25. Every sequent rule of the calculus GdSfde preserves dSfde-
validity.
Proof. Obviously the axiom and the structural rules preserve validity.
We prove the case for the restricted operational rules and leave the rest
as an exercise for the reader.
Ad [¬HL] Let v be a dSfde valuation such that v dSfde Γ  ϕ,∆ and
assume var(ϕ) ⊆ var(∆). Suppose v(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all γ ∈ Γ ∪ {¬ϕ}.
Then, by hypothesis, v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some δ ∈ ∆, or v(ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤}.
Since v(¬ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤}, then v(ϕ) ∈ {f ,⊤}. If v(ϕ) = f , then v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}
for some δ ∈ ∆. If v(ϕ) = ⊤, then v(p) = ⊤ for some p ∈ var(ϕ).
Since var(ϕ) ⊆ var(∆), there is a δ ∈ ∆ such that q ∈ var(δ) and
v(q) = ⊤, hence v(δ) = ⊤ for some δ ∈ ∆. In both cases it follows that
v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some δ ∈ ∆, establishing that v dSfde Γ,¬ϕ ∆.
Ad [∧HL] Let v be a dSfde valuation such that v dSfde Γ, ϕ, ψ∆ and
assume var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(∆). Suppose v(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all γ ∈ Γ∪{ϕ∧ψ}.
If v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t, then given the dSfde truth-function for conjunction,
we can establish that v(ϕ) = t and v(ψ) = t, hence by hypothesis
v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some δ ∈ ∆. If v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = ⊤, then either there is
a p ∈ var(ϕ) such that v(p) = ⊤, or there is a q ∈ var(ψ) such that
v(q) = ⊤. Either way, since var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(∆) we know that there is
a δ ∈ ∆ such that there is an r ∈ var(δ) for which v(r) = ⊤, hence
v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some δ ∈ ∆. In both cases it follows that v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}
for some δ ∈ ∆, establishing v dSfde Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ∆.
Ad [¬∨HL] Let v be a dSfde valuation such that v dSfde Γ,¬ϕ,¬ψ∆
and assume var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(∆). Suppose v(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all γ ∈
Γ ∪ {¬(ϕ∨ψ)}. If v(¬(ϕ∨ψ)) = t, then given the dSfde truth-functions
for negation and disjunction, we can establish that v(¬ϕ) = t and
v(¬ψ) = t, and hence by hypothesis v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some δ ∈ ∆.
If v(¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)) = ⊤, then either there is a p ∈ var(ϕ) such that v(p) =
⊤, or there is a q ∈ var(ψ) such that v(q) = ⊤. Either way, since
var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(∆) we know that there is a δ ∈ ∆ such that there is
an r ∈ var(δ) for which v(r) = ⊤, hence v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some δ ∈ ∆.
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In both cases it follows that v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some δ ∈ ∆, establishing
v dSfde Γ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∆.
Theorem 5.26 (Soundness of GdSfde). Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty
set of formulae of L. If Γ ∆ is provable in GdSfde, then dSfde Γ ∆.
Proof. If Γ ∆ is an axiom, then it is valid in GdSfde. By induction
on the depth of a derivation of Γ ∆ in GdSfde it follows, by the above
Lemma 5.25, that Γ ∆ is valid in GdSfde.
Proposition 5.27 (Non-triviality of GdSfde). Let Γ be a finite non-
empty set of formulae of L. The sequent Γ  ∅ is not provable in GdSfde.
Proof. Let v be a dSfde-valuation such that v(p) = ⊤ for every p ∈
var(Γ ). It follows that v 2dSfde Γ  ∅ and thus 2dSfde Γ  ∅. By con-
traposition of Soundness, we can conclude that the sequent Γ  ∅ is not
provable in GdSfde.
We now turn to completeness.
Proposition 5.28. Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae of
L. If Γ ∆ is provable in GdSfde, then it is provable in GK3.
Proof. Straightforward, since GdSfde is a restriction of GK3.
Lemma 5.29. Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae of L. If
Γ ∆ is provable in GK3 and var(Γ ) ⊆ var(∆), then Γ ∆ is provable
in GdSfde without using the Cut rule.
Proof. Remember that proofs in sequent calculi are rooted binary trees
such that the root is the sequent being proved and the leaves of the tree
are instances of [Id ] in other words, sequents of the form ϕ  ϕ.
Now assume that Π is a Cut-free derivation of Γ  ∆ in GK3 such
that var(Γ ) ⊆ var(∆). If Π is a Cut-free derivation in GdSfde, then the
result is established. If Π is not a Cut-free derivation in GdSfde, then
there must be in Π applications of the rules [¬L], [∧L] and [¬∨L] where
the required provisos are not satisfied
Γ ∗ ∆∗, ϕ
Γ ∗,¬ϕ ∆∗
[¬L]
Γ ∗, ϕ, ψ ∆∗
Γ ∗, ϕ ∧ ψ ∆∗
[∧L]
Γ ∗,¬ϕ,¬ψ ∆∗
Γ ∗,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∆∗
[¬∨L]
Now, since Π is a Cut-free proof, we are guaranteed that the root sequent
Γ ∆ contains all the propositional variables appearing in Π. Since, by
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hypothesis, we know that var(Γ ) ⊆ var(∆), we can affirm that var(Π) =
var(∆).
What is left is, then, to design a procedure to transform Π into a
Cut-free proof of Γ ∆ in GdSfde. We do this in two steps. First, we
enlarge every node of Π by adding ∆ to its right-hand side. By doing
this, we obtain a rooted binary tree Π′, whose leaves are sequents of the
form ϕ  ϕ,∆. Second, we extend each leaf with a branch starting in
an instance of [Id], that is, a sequent of the form ϕ  ϕ, followed by any
number of necessary iterated applications of the right Weakening rule
[WR], so that the sequent ϕ  ϕ,∆ is obtained.
From this procedure, we get a rooted binary tree Π′′ which is un-
doubtedly a Cut-free derivation in GK3 of the sequent Γ ∆, such that
the critical instances of the rules [¬L], [∨L] and [¬∧R] have in Π′′ the
form
Γ ∗  ϕ,∆∗, ∆
Γ ∗,¬ϕ ∆∗, ∆
[¬L]
Γ ∗, ϕ, ψ ∆∗, ∆
Γ ∗, ϕ ∧ ψ ∆∗, ∆
[∧L]
Γ ∗,¬ϕ,¬ψ ∆∗, ∆
Γ ∗,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∆∗, ∆
[¬∨L]
and are, thus, admissible in GdSfde. Finally, from this we infer that Π′′
is a Cut-free derivation in GdSfde of the sequent Γ ∆.
Corollary 5.30. Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae of L.
If dSfde Γ ∆ but var(Γ ) ( var(∆), then there is a Γ
′ ⊆ Γ such that
dSfde Γ
′
∆, where var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(∆).
Proof. First, notice that if dSfde Γ  ∆, then var(Γ ) 6= ∅ 6= var(∆).
Now assume dSfde Γ  ∆ but var(Γ ) * var(∆). Hence, define Γ
′ =
Γ \ {γ ∈ Γ | var(γ) * var(∆)}, hence Γ ′ ⊂ Γ and var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(∆).
Suppose there is a dSfde valuation v such that v(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all
γ ∈ Γ ′. If v(γ) = ⊤ for some γ ∈ Γ ′, then v(p) = ⊤ for some p ∈ var(γ)
and, therefore, v(p) = ⊤ for some p ∈ var(Γ ′). Since var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(∆),
then v(q) = ⊤ for some q ∈ var(∆), hence there is a δ ∈ ∆ such that
v(δ) = ⊤. This establishes dSfde Γ
′
 ∆. If v(γ) = t for all γ ∈ Γ ′,
then suppose for reductio that v(δ) ∈ {⊥, f} for all δ ∈ ∆, which implies
that 2dSfde Γ
′
 ∆. But then, v(p) ∈ {t,⊥, f} for all p ∈ var(∆). And
since var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(∆), this will also require that v(q) ∈ {t,⊥, f} for all
q ∈ var(Γ ′). Consider, now, a dSfde valuation v∗ such that
v∗(p) =
{
⊤ if p ∈ var(Γ ) \ var(∆)
v(p) if p ∈ var(∆)
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Then, by the above this will imply v∗(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all γ ∈ Γ , but
v∗(δ) ∈ {⊥, f} for all δ ∈ ∆, hence v∗ witnesses 2dSfde Γ∆, contrdaciting
our initial assumption. Therefore, if dSfde Γ ∆ but var(Γ ) ( var(∆),
then there is a Γ ′ ⊆ Γ such that dSfde Γ
′
∆, where var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(∆).
Theorem 5.31 (Completeness of GdSfde). Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-
empty set of formulae of L. If dSfde Γ ∆, then Γ ∆ is provable in
GdSfde without using the Cut rule.
Proof. Assume dSfde Γ  ∆. By Observation 5.6, we know that K3
Γ ∆, and also by Theorem 5.15 we are granted that Γ ∆ is provable
in GK3. To finally establish that Γ  ∆ is provable in GdSfde without
using the Cut rule, we consider two cases. First, if var(Γ ) ⊆ var(∆), we
know by Lemma 5.29 that this is the case. Second, if var(Γ ) ( var(∆),
we know by Corollary 5.30 that there is a Γ ′ ⊆ Γ such that dSfde Γ ∆
′,
where var(Γ ′) ⊆ var(∆). Now, by Lemma 5.29 we know that Γ ′ ∆ is
provable in GdSfde without using the Cut rule, by means of a proof Π1
(i.e., a rooted binary tree) whose root is Γ ′  ∆ and whose leaves are
instances of [Id], of the form ϕ  ϕ. Finally, we transform Π1 into a
proof Π′1, by extending down the node Γ
′
∆ by means of the required
iterated applications of the left Weakening rule [WL], until we arrive at
the sequent Γ  ∆. But this rooted binary tree Π′1 is now a proof in
GdSfde of the sequent Γ ∆, without using the Cut rule.
Corollary 5.32 (Cut-elimination for dSfde). Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-
empty set of formulae in L. If the sequent Γ ∆ is provable in GdSfde,
then there is a Cut-free derivation of Γ ∆ in GdSfde.
Proof. Assume that Γ ∆′ is provable in GdSfde. By Theorem 5.34,
that is, because the system is sound, we know that GdSfde Γ ∆. But
then by Theorem 5.39, that is, because the system is complete, we know
that Γ ∆ is provable in GdSfde without using the Cut rule.
5.4. Soundness and Completeness for GSfde
Lemma 5.33. Every sequent rule of the calculus GSfde preserves Sfde-
validity.
Proof. Obviously the axiom and the structural rules preserve validity.
We prove the case for the restricted operational rules and leave the rest
as an exercise for the reader.
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Ad [¬BR] Let v be a Sfde valuation such that v Sfde Γ, ϕ ∆ and
assume that var(ϕ) ⊆ var(Γ ). Suppose v(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all γ ∈ Γ .
Thus, v(p) ∈ {t,⊤, f} for all p ∈ var(Γ ). Since var(ϕ) ⊆ var(Γ ), we also
know that v(q) ∈ {t,⊤, f} for all q ∈ var(ϕ). Hence, v(ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤, f}.
If v(ϕ) ∈ {⊤, f}, then v(¬ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤}, hence v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some
δ ∈ ∆ ∪ {¬ϕ}. If v(ϕ) = t, then by hypothesis there is a δ ∈ ∆ such
that v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}, hence v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤} for some δ ∈ ∆ ∪ {¬ϕ}. Either
way, this establishes v Sfde Γ  ¬ϕ,∆.
Ad [∨BR] Let v be a Sfde valuation such that v Sfde Γ ϕ, ψ,∆ and
assume that var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(Γ ). Suppose v(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all γ ∈ Γ .
Hence, v(p) ∈ {t,⊤, f}, for all p ∈ var(Γ ). Since var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(Γ )
we know that v(q) ∈ {t,⊤, f}, for all q ∈ var(ϕ, ψ) and, moreover,
v(ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤, f} and v(ψ) ∈ {t,⊤, f}. By hypothesis, there is a δ ∈
∆ ∪ {ϕ, ψ} such that v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}. Thus, either there is a δ ∈ ∆
such that v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}, or v(ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤}, or v(ψ) ∈ {t,⊤}. Finally,
given v(ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤, f} and v(ψ) ∈ {t,⊤, f}, and given the Sfde truth-
function for disjunction, we can establish that in all these cases it follows
that there is a δ ∈ ∆ ∪ {ϕ ∨ ψ} such that v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}. Therefore,
v Sfde Γ  ϕ ∨ ψ,∆.
Ad [¬∧BR] Let v be a Sfde valuation such that v Sfde Γ ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆
and assume that var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ var(Γ ). Suppose v(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all
γ ∈ Γ . Thus, v(p) ∈ {t,⊤, f}, for all p ∈ var(ϕ, ψ). Since var(ϕ, ψ) ⊆
var(Γ ) we know that v(q) ∈ {t,⊤, f}, for all q ∈ var(ϕ, ψ) and, moreover,
that v(¬ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤, f} and v(¬ψ) ∈ {t,⊤, f}. By hypothesis, there is
a δ ∈ ∆ ∪ {¬ϕ,¬ψ} such that v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}. Thus, either there is a
δ ∈ ∆ such that v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}, or v(¬ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤}, or v(¬ψ) ∈ {t,⊤}.
Finally, given v(¬ϕ) ∈ {t,⊤, f} and v(¬ψ) ∈ {t,⊤, f}, and given the
Sfde truth-functions for negation and conjunction, we can establish that
in all these cases it follows that there is δ ∈ ∆ ∪ {¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)} such that
v(δ) ∈ {t,⊤}. Therefore, v Sfde Γ  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), ∆.
Theorem 5.34 (Soundness of GSfde). Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty
set of formulae of L. If Γ ∆ is provable in GSfde, then Sfde Γ ∆.
Proof. If Γ  ∆ is an axiom, then it is valid in GSfde. By induction
on the depth of a derivation of Γ ∆ in GSfde it follows, by the above
Lemma 5.33, that Γ ∆ is valid in GSfde.
Proposition 5.35 (Non-triviality of GSfde). Let Γ be a finite non-empty
set of formulae of L. The sequent Γ  ∅ is not provable in GSfde.
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Proof. Let v be a Sfde-valuation such that v(p) = ⊤ for every p ∈
var(Γ ). It follows that v 2Sfde Γ∅ and thus 2Sfde Γ∅. By contraposition
of Soundness, we can conclude that the sequent Γ  ∅ is not provable in
GSfde.
We now turn to completeness.
Proposition 5.36. Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae of
L. If Γ ∆ is provable in GSfde, then it is provable in GLP.
Proof. Straightforward, since GSfde is a restriction of GLP.
Lemma 5.37. Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae of L. If
Γ ∆ is provable in GLP and var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ ), then Γ ∆ is provable
in GSfde without using the Cut rule.
Proof. Remember that proofs in sequent calculi are rooted binary trees
such that the root is the sequent being proved and the leaves of the tree
are instances of [Id ] in other words, sequents of the form ϕ  ϕ.
Now assume that Π is a Cut-free derivation of Γ ∆ in GLP such that
var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ ). If Π is a Cut-free derivation in GSfde, then the result
is established. If Π is not a Cut-free derivation in GSfde, then there must
be in Π applications of the rules [¬R], [∨R] or [¬∧R] where the required
provisos are not satisfied
Γ ∗, ϕ ∆∗
Γ ∗  ¬ϕ,∆∗
[¬R]
Γ ∗  ϕ, ψ,∆∗
Γ ∗  ϕ ∨ ψ,∆∗
[∨R]
Γ ∗  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), ∆∗
Γ ∗  ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆∗
[¬∧R]
Now, since Π is a Cut-free proof, we are guaranteed that the root sequent
Γ ∆ contains all the propositional variables appearing in Π. Since, by
hypothesis, we know that var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ ), we can affirm that var(Π) =
var(Γ ).
What is left is, then, to design an algorithmic procedure to transform
Π into a Cut-free proof of Γ ∆ in GSfde. We do this in two steps. First,
we enlarge every node of Π by adding Γ to its left-hand side. By doing
this, we obtain a rooted binary tree Π′, whose leaves are sequents of
the form Γ, ϕ  ϕ. Second, we extend each leaf with a branch starting
in an instance of [Id ], that is, a sequent of the form ϕ  ϕ, followed by
any number of necessary iterated applications of the left Weakening rule
[WL], so that the sequent Γ, ϕ  ϕ is obtained.
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From this procedure, we get a rooted binary tree Π′′ which is un-
doubtedly a Cut-free derivation in GLP of the sequent Γ ∆, such that
the critical instances of the rules [¬R], [∨L] and [¬∧R] have in Π′′ the
form
Γ, Γ ∗, ϕ ∆∗
Γ, Γ ∗  ¬ϕ,∆∗
[¬R]
Γ, Γ ∗  ϕ, ψ,∆∗
Γ, Γ ∗  ϕ ∨ ψ,∆∗
[∨R]
Γ, Γ ∗  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), ∆∗
Γ, Γ ∗  ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆∗
[¬∧R]
and are, thus, admissible in GSfde. Finally, from this we infer that Π′′ is
a Cut-free derivation in GSfde of the sequent Γ ∆.
Corollary 5.38. Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulae of
L. If Sfde Γ ∆ but var(∆) ( var(Γ ), then there is a ∆
′ ⊆ ∆ such that
Sfde Γ ∆
′, where var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ ).
Proof. First, notice that if Sfde Γ  ∆, then var(Γ ) 6= ∅ 6= var(∆).
Now assume Sfde Γ  ∆ but var(∆) * var(Γ ). Hence, define ∆
′ =
∆ \ {δ ∈ ∆ | var(δ) * var(Γ )}, hence ∆′ ⊂ ∆ and var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ ).
Suppose additionally, for reductio, that there is a Sfde valuation v such
that v(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all γ ∈ Γ , but v(δ) ∈ {⊥, f} for all δ ∈ ∆′, thus
implying 2Sfde Γ ∆




⊥ if p ∈ var(∆) \ var(Γ )
v(p) if p ∈ var(Γ )
Hence, v∗ is such that v∗(γ) ∈ {t,⊤} for all γ ∈ Γ , but v∗(δ) ∈ {⊥, f}
for all δ ∈ ∆, hence v∗ witnesses 2Sfde Γ  ∆, contradicting our initial
assumption. Thus, there is a ∆′ ⊂ ∆ such that Sfde Γ  ∆
′, where
var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ ). Therefore, if Sfde Γ ∆ but var(∆) ( var(Γ ), then
there is a ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that Sfde Γ ∆
′, where var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ ).
Theorem 5.39 (Completeness of GSfde). Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-
empty set of formulae of L. If Sfde Γ  ∆, then Γ  ∆ is provable in
GSfde without using the Cut rule.
Proof. Assume Sfde Γ  ∆. By Observation 5.3, we know that LP
Γ ∆, and also by Theorem 5.16 we are granted that Γ ∆ is provable
in GLP. To finally establish that Γ  ∆ is provable in GSfde without
using the Cut rule, we consider two cases. First, if var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ ), we
know by Lemma 5.37 that this is the case. Second, if var(∆) ( var(Γ ),
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we know by Corollary 5.38 that there is a ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that Sfde Γ ∆
′,
where var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ ). Now, by Lemma 5.37 we know that Γ ∆′ is
provable in GSfde without using the Cut rule, by means of a proof Π1
(i.e., a rooted binary tree) whose root is Γ  ∆′ and whose leaves are
instances of [Id], of the form ϕ  ϕ. Finally, we transform Π1 into a
proof Π′1, by extending down the node Γ ∆
′ by means of the required
iterated applications of the right Weakening rule [WR], until we arrive
at the sequent Γ ∆. But this rooted binary tree Π′1 is now a proof in
GSfde of the sequent Γ ∆, without using the Cut rule.
Corollary 5.40 (Cut-elimination for Sfde). Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite
nonempty set of formulae in L. If the sequent Γ  ∆ is provable in
Γ ∆ in GSfde, then there is a Cut-free derivation of Γ ∆ in GSfde.
Proof. Assume that Γ  ∆′ is provable in GSfde. By Theorem 5.34,
that is, because the system is sound, we know that GSfde Γ  ∆. But
then by Theorem 5.39, that is, because the system is complete, we know
that Γ ∆ is provable in GSfde without using the Cut rule.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that, by following Fitting’s epistemic inter-
pretation of the strong Kleene logics K3 and FDE, and the Paracomplete
Weak Kleene logic Kw3 , an up-to-now unnoticed epistemic interpretation
of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic PWK is available. This interpreta-
tion is revealed by focusing on a four-valued generalization of PWK,
namely the logic dSfde, and showing that its truth-functions can be
interpreted in terms of what we called track-down operations. These
operations, built inspired by the idea that no consistent opinion can
arise from a set that includes an inconsistent opinion, coincide with the
truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene when certain reasonable
constraints are assumed.
In addition to providing this novel interpretation of Paraconsistent
Weak Kleene, the failure of Conjunctive Simplification in such a system
and its sublogics is discussed in terms of track-down conjunctions and
also in connection with containment logics. Concerning this latter rela-
tion, Paraconsistent Weak Kleene is shown to be closely related, and its
theoremless subsystems are shown to belong, to a family of systems that
respect a containment principle dual to Parry’s Proscriptive Principle
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for entailment. These considerations mirror the previous remarks made
in the literature concerning the other three-valued weak Kleene logic,
namely Kw3 , whose subsystems containing no anti-theorems were shown
by Ferguson to respect Parry’s Proscriptive Principle for entailment.
These observations allowed us to design sound and complete Gentzen-
style sequent calculi for this four-valued generalizations of PWK and Kw3 ,
i.e., the systems we referred to as dSfde and Sfde, drawing inspiration
from the techniques recently applied by Coniglio and Corbalán to provide
calculi of these sort for the three-valued weak Kleene logics. The main
feature of these calculi, both for logics of the three- and four-valued kinds,
was the presence of linguistic (i.e., variable inclusion) provisos in some of
the operational rules for the calculi, pertaining to the set of propositional
variables of the active formulae of the corresponding rules, and the set
of propositional variables appearing in some of the side formulae of such
rules.
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